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Christian	J.	Tams*	
	
	
1.	Introduction	
	
Over	the	past	two	decades,	as	the	discipline	has	moved	 into	the	 legal	mainstream,	
investment	 lawyers	 have	 engaged	 with	 many	 core	 aspects	 of	 public	 international	
law.	 Rules	 on	 remedies,	 defences	 such	 as	 necessity,	 the	 canons	 of	 treaty	
interpretation,	 Vienna	 Convention	 rules	 on	 denunciation	 –	 all	 these	 now	 regularly	
feature	in	 investment	jurisprudence	and	form	the	subject	of	engaged	commentary.	
Their	increasing	relevance	reflects	the	gradual	integration	of	investment	law	into	the	
international	legal	discourse.1		
	
Among	 the	 core	 aspects	 of	 international	 law,	 the	 legal	 rules	 governing	 State	
succession	occupy	a	special	place.	State	succession	–	typically	understood	to	mean	
“the	definitive	replacement	of	one	State	by	another	in	respect	of	sovereignty	over	a	
given	territory”2	–	is	one	of	the	lesser-liked	branches	of	public	international	law.	It	is	
widely	 perceived	 to	 be	 technical,	 complex	 and	 controversial:	 an	 area	 of	 law	
characterised	by	“an	almost	total	doctrinal	schism”3	(notably	between	supporters	of	
a	continuity	approach,	and	those	arguing	that	new	State	should	be	able	to	start	with	
a	 ‘clean	 slate’4),	 but	 also	 by	 the	 nitty-gritty	 detail	 of	 bilateral	 diplomatic	 practice.	
Many	 international	 lawyers,	 including	 those	with	generalist	 leanings,	 tend	 to	 steer																																																									
*	The	author	is	Professor	of	International	Law	at	the	University	of	Glasgow	and	an	Academic	Member	
of	Matrix	(London)	[christian.tams@glasgow.ac.uk].	
1	For	 academic	 commentary	 see	 e.g.	 F.	 Baetens	 (ed),	 Investment	 Law	 Within	 International	 Law:	
Integrationist	 Perspectives	 (2013);	 R.	 Hofmann/C.J.	 Tams	 (eds),	 Investment	 Law	 and	 General	
International	Law:	From	Clinical	Isolation	to	Systemic	Integration?	(2011);	R.	Hofmann/C.J.	Tams	(eds),	
International	Investment	Law	and	Its	Others	(2012).	
2	J	 Crawford,	 Brownlie’s	 Principles	 of	 Public	 International	 Law	 (8th	 edn.,	 2012),	 423.	 A	 very	 similar	
definition	 is	 set	 out	 in	 Article	 2(1)(b)	 of	 the	 1978	 Vienna	 Convention	 on	 Succession	 of	 States	 in	
Respect	of	Treaties,	United	Nations	Treaty	Series,	vol.	1946,	3,	and	 International	Legal	Materials	17	
(1978),	1488.	
3	M	 Craven,	 The	 Problem	 of	 State	 Succession	 and	 the	 Identity	 of	 States	 under	 International	 Law,	
European	Journal	of	International	Law	9	(1998)	142,	143.		
4	See	further	below,	sections	2	and	4.		
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clear	 of	 it.	 Until	 recently,	 investment	 lawyers	 did	 not	 show	 much	 interest	 in	 it	
either.5	
	
In	 fairness,	 until	 recently,	 State	 succession	 to	 investment	 treaties	 may	 not	 have	
seemed	 a	 topic	 worthy	 of	 detailed	 analysis.	 The	 contemporary	 incarnation	 of	 the	
investment	 protection	 regime,	 based	 on	 bilateral	 investment	 treaties	 and	 regular	
access	 to	 international	 arbitration,	 is	 of	 fairly	 recent	 origin	 after	 all;	 it	 was	
established	simply	too	late	to	be	affected	by	the	main	waves	of	state	succession	that	
swept	the	international	system	before	the	1970s.	To	be	sure,	the	most	important	of	
them	–	the	decolonisation	process	that	resulted	in	the	creation	of	dozens	of	States	
after	 1945	 –	 prompted	 heated	 debates	 about	 the	 status	 of	 alien	 property	 post	
independence. 6 	However,	 at	 the	 time,	 these	 debates	 typically	 implicated		
contractual	 arrangements	 and	 rules	 of	 general	 international	 law	 (notably	 on	
expropriation)	rather	than	investment	treaties	and	treaty-based	arbitration.7	In	fact,	
even	the	next	wave	of	succession,	viz.	the	break-up	of	States	in	Central	and	Eastern	
Europe	 during	 the	 1990s,	 for	 a	 while	 was	 not	 considered	 to	 raise	 real	 issues	 of	
investment	treaty	law.8		
	
Yet	change	seems	under	way.	Two	prominent	decisions	in	the	pending	proceedings	
between	 Sanum	 and	 the	 Lao	 People's	 Democratic	 Republic	 (‘Laos’)	 have	 exposed	
sharp	 divisions	 in	 the	 application	 of	 State	 succession	 rules:	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	
																																																								
5	In	a	recent	piece,	Patrick	Dumberry	 lamented	“[t]he	absence	of	any	research	on	the	 issue	of	State	
succession	to	BITs"	and	criticised	tribunals	for	having,	with	few	exceptions,	failed	to	offer	"reasoning	
on	 …	 basic	 State	 succession	 issues"	 (which	 he	 considered	 "disappointing"):	 see	 An	 Uncharted	
Question	 of	 State	 Succession:	 Are	 New	 States	 Automatically	 Bound	 by	 the	 BITs	 Concluded	 by	
Predecessor	States	Before	 Independence?,	Journal	of	 International	Dispute	Settlement	6	(2015),	74,	
at	96.		
6 	Mohammed	 Bedjaoui’s	 Second	 Report	 to	 the	 UN	 International	 Law	 Commission	 (discussing	
economic	 and	 financial	 acquired	 rights)	 gives	 a	 flavour	 of	 the	 debates:	 see	 Second	 Report	 on	
Succession	of	States	in	Respect	of	Matters	Other	Than	Treaties,	ILC	Yearbook	1969,	vol.	II,	69.		
7	Newcombe	and	Paradell	make	the	point	very	clearly:	"The	foreign	investment	disputes	that	ensued	
[following	 decolonization]	 focused	 on	 two	 principal	 issues:	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 acquired	 rights,	
including	 natural	 resource	 concessions	 granted	 by	 colonial	 powers,	were	 to	 be	 respected;	 and	 the	
standard	 of	 compensation	 for	 the	 expropriation	 of	 those	 acquired	 rights"	 (in	 Law	 and	 Practice	
of	Investment	Treaties:	Standards	of	Treatment	(2009),	at	19).		
8	See	below,	section	4,	for	brief	comment.	
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proceedings,	 an	 UNCITRAL	 tribunal9	and	 the	 Singapore	 High	 Court10	disagreed	 on	
whether	the	China-Laos	BIT	concluded	in	1993	applied	to	Macao	(a	territory	formerly	
administered	 by	 Portugal,	 but	 returned	 to	 China	 in	 1999).11	Arbitration	 websites	
report	a	 that	“[i]n	a	dramatic	holding"	of	 January	2016,	an	UNCITRAL	tribunal	held	
Kazakhstan	to	be	bound	by	 the	terms	of	a	BIT	concluded	by	 the	Soviet	Union,	and	
speculate	about	further	cases	turning	on	issues	of	state	succession.12	The	existence	
of	 independence	movements	 in	States	 fully	 integrated	 into	the	present	 investment	
protection	regime	(in	Scotland/the	United	Kingdom,	Catalonia/Spain,	etc.)	 suggests	
that	 the	 issue	 will	 remain	 on	 the	 agenda	 for	 the	 foreseeable	 future.	 Perhaps	
unsurprisingly,	 recent	academic	commentary	has	begun	to	explore	the	relationship	
between	 investment	 treaties	 and	 State	 succession;	 however,	 so	 far,	 much	 of	 it	
remains	 focused	 on	 the	 issues	 raised	 in	 the	 Sanum	 litigation13	and	 the	 perennial	
“doctrinal	 schism” 14 	between	 adherents	 of	 ‘clean	 slate’	 and	 ‘strict	 continuity’	
approaches.15																																																										
9	Sanum	 Investments	 Limited	 v	 Laos,	 UNCITRAL	 (PCA	 Case	 No	 2013-13),	 Award	 on	 Jurisdiction,	 13	
	December	 2013.	 A	 related	 claim	 has	 been	 registered	 by	 the	 parent	 company	 Sanum	 Investment	
Limited:	see	Lao	Holdings	NV	v	Lao	Peoples	Democratic	Republic	(ICSID	Case	No	ARB(AF)/12/6).	
10	Lao	People’s	Republic	v.	Sanum	Investments	Limited,	Judgment,	[2015]	SGHC	15.	
11	For	 brief	 comment	 see	 below,	 section	 5.	 Kugelmann	 provides	 a	 concise	 historical	 account:	 D	
Kugelmann,	Macau,	in	Max	Planck	Encyclopedia	of	Public	International	Law	(www.mpepil.com).		
12	See	LE	Petersen,	In	a	dramatic	holding,	UNCITRAL	tribunal	finds	that	Kazakhstan	is	bound	by	terms	
of	former	USSR	BIT	with	Canada,	Investment	Arbitration	Reporter,	28	Jan	2016	(at	
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/in-a-dramatic-holding-uncitral-tribunal-finds-that-kazakhstan-is-
bound-by-terms-of-former-ussr-bit-with-canada/)	and	further	MD	Goldhaber,	Arbitration	Scorecard	
2013:	Treaty	Disputes,	The	American	Lawyer,	at	
http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202607030938/Arbitration-Scorecard-2013-Treaty-Disputes	
(describing	Sudapet	Company	Ltd.	v.	Republic	of	South	Sudan	–	though	perhaps	not	quite	accurately,	
as	will	become	clear	in	the	course	of	this	article	–	as	"the	first	ICSID	dispute	[believed]	to	turn	on	
issues	of	state	succession").		
13	See	 e.g.	 N	 Hart	 and	 S	 Srikumar,	 Investor-State	 Arbitration	 before	 the	 High	 Court	 of	 Singapore:	
Territoriality,Nationality	and	Arbitrability,	Cambridge	Journal	of	International	and	Comparative	Law	4	
(2015),	 191;	 G	 Wang,	 International	 Investment	 Law:	 A	 Chinese	 Perspective	 (2014),	 at	 568-570;	 M	
Hwang	and	A	Chang,	Case	Comment:	Government	of	the	Lao	People’s	Democratic	Republic	v	Sanum	
Investments	 Ltd:	 A	 Tale	 of	 Two	 Letters,	 ICSID	 Review	 30	 (2015),	 506;	 D	 Lim,	 Case	 Comment:	
Government	 of	 the	 Lao	 People's	 Democratic	 Republic	 v	 Sanum	 Investments	 Ltd	 [2015]	 SGHC	 15,	
Singapore	 Law	 Blog,	 at	 http://www.singaporelawblog.sg/blog/article/95;	 as	 well	 as	 The	 Virtue	 of	
Judicial	Restraint:	Two	Comments	on	Laos	v	Sanum,	Global	Arbitration	Reporter,	vol.	10/2	(2015),	at		
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/journal/article/33620/virtue-judicial-restraint-two-comments-
laos-v-sanum.		
14	Craven	(n	3),	143.	
15	See	notably	Dumberry	(n	5)	as	well	as	id.,	State	Succession	to	Bilateral	Treaties:	A	Few	Observations	
on	the	 Incoherent	and	Unjustifiable	Solution	Adopted	for	Secession	and	Dissolution	of	States	under	
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Against	 this	 background	 of	 long-term	 neglect	 and	 recent	 (selective)	 interest,	 the	
present	 paper	 presents	 a	 bird’s	 eye	 account	 of	 questions	 of	 State	 succession	 that	
arise	in	relation	to	investment	treaties.	The	approach	adopted	is	deliberately	broad:	
what	 is	 intended	 is	 not	 an	 in-depth	discussion	of	particular	problems	 (such	as,	 for	
example,	 the	 status	 of	 Macao	 under	 Chinese	 BITs).	 Instead,	 the	 subsequent	
considerations	 are	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 conspectus	 of	 the	 legal	 rules	 applicable	 to	
different	types	of	succession	scenarios,	offered	to	inform	debate	about	a	particularly	
tricky	area	of	public	international	law	now	confronting	investment	lawyers.		
	
2.	Succession	to	Treaties:	Basic	Features	
When	one	State	replaces	another	as	the	sovereign	of	a	particular	part	of	territory,	a	
number	 of	 legal	 problems	 can	 arise.	 Do	 individuals	 affected	 by	 the	 change	
automatically	 become	 nationals	 of	 the	 new	 State?	 How	 are	 State	 assets	 and	
liabilities	 to	be	dealt	with?	What	 is	 the	 fate	of	claims	 lodged	before	 the	change	of	
sovereignty?	And	what	happens	to	treaties	concluded	into	prior	to	that	date?	These	
issues	 all	 relate	 to	 the	 transfer	 of	 some	 legal	 entitlement	 or	 obligation	 from	 one	
State	 to	 another;	 and	 they	 are	 commonly	 addressed	 as	 questions	 of	 ‘State	
succession’.16	To	set	the	stage	for	the	analysis	of	problems	in	relation	to	investment	
treaties,	a	few	introductory	words	about	the	basic	features	of	legal	regime	governing	
State	succession	seem	in	order.		
																																																																																																																																																															
the	 1978	 Vienna	 Convention,	 Leiden	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 28	 (2014),	 3	 (offering	 a	 vigorous	
critique	of	the	‘strict	continuity’	approach);	and	further	A	Genest,	Sudan	Bilateral	Investment	Treaties	
and	 South	 Sudan:	 Musings	 on	 State	 Succession	 to	 Bilateral	 Treaties	 in	 the	 Wake	 of	 Yugoslavia's	
Breakup,	Transnational	Dispute	Management,	vol.	11/3	(2014);	Q	Qerimi	and	S	Krasniqi,	Theories	and	
Practice	 of	 State	 	Succession	 to	 Bilateral	 Treaties:	 The	 Recent	 Experience	 of	 Kosovo,	 German	 Law	
Journal	14	(2013),	1359.	Going	beyond	country	studies,	Tai-Heng	Cheng	provides	a	fuller	analysis,	but	
his	 approach	 is	based	on	a	 rather	broad	notion	of	 ‘State	 succession’,	which,	 contrary	 to	most	 legal	
authorities,	 he	 understands	 to	 encompass	 “state	 and	 government	 succession”:	 see	 his	 State	
Succession	and	Commercial	Obligations	(2006),	at	4;	and	cf.	below,	section	2.b.,	for	comment.		
16	As	 Crawford	 notes,	 "the	 phrase	 'state	 succession’	 is	 employed	 to	 describe	 an	 area,	 a	 source	 of	
problems:	it	does	not	connote	any	overriding	principle,	or	even	a	presumption,	that	a	transmission	or	
succession	of	legal	rights	and	duties	occurs	in	a	given	case”;	in	this	sense,	the	“municipal	analogy	of	
continuity	of	legal	personality	in	an	individual’s	general	property,	passing	as	an	inheritance,	involving	
a	partial	or	‘universal	succession'”	is	indeed	“misleading”:	see	Crawford	(n	2),	423-424;	and	further	M	
Craven,	The	Decolonization	of	International	Law:	State	Succession	and	the	Law	of	Treaties	(2007),	at	
29-31.	
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a)	A	Fragmented	and	Disputed	Area	of	Law		
The	legal	regime	governing	questions	of	succession	is	fragmented	and,	as	a	general	
matter,	not	well	established.17	To	begin	with,	its	organising	concept	–	the	notion	of	a	
State’s	‘replacement	in	relation	to	territory’18	–	is	rather	diffuse.	It	covers	instances	
as	 diverse	 as	 the	 separation	 (secession)	 of	 parts	 of	 a	 State	 from	 that	 State;	 a	
dependent	 territory’s	 move	 to	 independence;	 the	 complete	 dismemberment	
(dissolution)	 of	 a	 State;	 the	 incorporation	 of	 one	 State	 into	 an	 existing	 one;	 the	
merger	 (fusion)	 of	 two	 or	more	 States	 into	 a	 new	 State;	 and	 cessions	 of	 territory	
between	existing	States.	As	will	be	shown	in	the	following,	the	legal	regime	of	State	
succession	 draws	 distinctions	 between	 these	 different	 modalities	 of	 succession	 –	
though	where	and	how	the	lines	precisely	are	drawn	is	often	a	matter	of	debate.		
	
The	present	 inquiry	centres	on	legal	relations	based	on	treaties,	and	it	discusses	to	
what	extent	the	successor	State	succeeds	to	treaty	rights	and	obligations	contracted	
by	 its	 predecessor	 in	 the	 field	 of	 investment	 law.	Of	 the	 various	 succession	 issues	
enumerated	above	(succession	to	debts,	to	assets,	to	nationality,	etc.)	this	is	perhaps	
the	most	protracted.	For	decades,	at	least	where	instances	of	succession	have	led	to	
the	 emergence	 of	 a	 new	 State,	 commentators	 have	 disagreed	 on	 the	 correct	
starting-point:	 should	 new	 States	 be	 required	 to	 adhere	 to	 treaty	 commitments	
																																																								
17	According	 to	 the	German	 Federal	 Constitutional	 Court,	 it	 “one	 of	 among	 the	most	 disputed	 and	
least	 secure	 parts	 of	 international	 law”	 ("eine[r]	 der	 umstrittensten	 und	 unsichersten	 Teile	 des	
gesamten	Völkerrechts"):	see	Collection	of	Decisions	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court,	vol.	96,	68,	
at	79.		For	excellent	overviews	of	the	legal	regime	see	Crawford	(n	2),	423-444;	G	Hafner	and	G	Novak,	
State	Succession	in	Respect	of	Treaties,	in	DB	Hollis	(ed),	The	Oxford	Guide	to	Treaties	(2012)	396;	A	
Zimmermann,	 State	 Succession	 in	 Treaties,	 in	Max	 Planck	 Encyclopedia	 of	 Public	 International	 Law	
(www.mpepil.com)	(‘Zimmermann,	EPIL’);	and	A	Zimmermann	and	JG	Devaney,	Succession	to	Treaties	
and	 the	 Inherent	 Limits	 of	 International	 Law,	 in	 CJ	 Tams/	 A	 Tzanakopoulos/A	 Zimmermann	 (eds),	
Research	Handbook	on	the	Law	of	Treaties	(2014),	521.		Comprehensive	accounts	are	provided	by	A	
Zimmermann,	 Staatennachfolge	 in	 völkerrechtliche	 Verträge—	 zugleich	 ein	 Beitrag	 zu	 den	
Möglichkeiten	und	Grenzen	völkerrechtlicher	Kodifikation	 (2000)	 (‘Zimmermann,	Staatennachfolge’);	
B	Stern,	La	succession	d’Etats,	in	Receuil	des	Cours,	vol.	262	(1996),	9;	A	Gruber,	Le	droit	international	
de	 la	 succession	 d'États	 (1986);	 PK	 Menon,	 The	Succession	 of	 States	 in	 Respect	 to	 Treaties,	 State	
Property,	 Archives,	 and	 Debts	 (1991);	 and	 DP	 O’Connell,	 State	 Succession	 In	 Municipal	 and	
International	 Law,	 2	 vols.	 (1967).	 Based	 on	 work	 conducted	 since	 1994,	 the	 International	 Law	
Association	 (‘ILA’)	 in	 2008	 adopted	 Resolution	 on	 ‘Aspects	 of	 the	 Law	 of	 State	 Succession’;	 the	
resolution	 and	 the	 Committee’s	 Report	 are	 available	 at	 http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/11	 and	 contained	 in	 ILA,	 Report	 of	 the	 Seventy	 Third	
Conference,	Rio	de	Janeiro	(2008).		
18	Cf.	Article	2(1)(b)	of	the	1978	Vienna	Convention.		
		 6	
entered	into	by	their	predecessors,	or	should	they	be	able	to	start	‘life’	with	a	clean	
slate?19	20th	 century	 international	 practice,	 prompted	 e.g.	 by	 the	 great	 waves	 of	
territorial	 re-ordering	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 two	 World	 Wars	 and	 the	 decolonisation	
movement,	 has	 not	 provided	 a	 clear-cut	 answer	 to	 this	 question.20	From	 the	 late	
1960s	onwards,	the	UN	International	Law	Commission	(‘ILC’)	engaged	in	a	conscious	
effort	of	(partial21)	legal	clarification	and	development,22	which	eventually	led	to	the	
adoption	 of	 the	 1978	 Vienna	 Convention	 on	 Succession	 of	 States	 in	 respect	 of	
Treaties	 (‘the	1978	Vienna	Convention’).23	That	Convention	 lays	down	default	 rules	
and	 provides	 an	 important	 point	 of	 reference;	 but	 its	 ratification	 record	 is	
disappointing,24	and	a	number	of	 its	normative	propositions	remain	controversial.25	
As	a	consequence,	the	Convention’s	impact	on	concrete	instances	of	succession	has	
been	 mixed:	 in	 the	 more	 recent	 cases	 –	 the	 dissolution	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 the	
CSFR;	 the	 break-up	 of	 Yugoslavia	 and	 the	 ensuing	 separation	 of	Montenegro	 and	
Kosovo;	 the	emergence	of	East	Timor,	Eritrea	and	South	Sudan	as	new	States;	and																																																									
19	Craven	 (n	 16)	 offers	 a	 detailed	 historical	 account	 (at	 29-92);	 Zimmermann	 and	 Devaney	 (n	 17)	
present	a	succinct	analysis	(at	516-518).		
20	Having	 surveyed	 practice,	 the	 International	 Law	 Commission	 observed	 in	 1974	 that	 "[a]	 close	
examination	of	State	practice	afforded	no	convincing	evidence	of	any	general	doctrine	by	reference	to	
which	the	various	problems	of	succession	in	respect	of	treaties	could	find	their	appropriate	solution”:	
see	ILC	Yearbook	1972,	vol.	II/1,	226	(para.	31).		
21	As	Brigitte	Stern	notes,	the	1978	Vienna	Convention	does	not	aim	to	regulate	succession	to	treaties	
comprehensively	(n	17,	at	125).	Notably,	it	provides	very	little	guidance	on	the	question	of	succession	
to	 constitutive	 treaties	 establishing	 international	 organisations:	 on	 this	 see	 Article	 4	 of	 the	 1978	
Vienna	Convention;	and	further	below,	section	3.	
22	The	 problem	 of	 state	 succession	 had	 already	 been	 included	 in	 Hersch	 Lauterpacht’s	 ‘Survey	 of	
International	Law	 in	Relation	to	 the	Work	of	Codification	of	 the	 International	Law	Commission’,	UN	
Doc.	A/CN.4/1/Rev.1	(1949).	Encouraged	by	the	UN	General	Assembly’s	Resolution	1686	(1961),	the	
ILC	began	to	consider	question	of	succession	to	treaties	in	the	1960s,	with	Sir	Humphrey	Waldock	and	
Sir	 Francis	 Vallat	 acting	 as	 special	 rapporteurs,	 and	 in	 1974	 presented	 a	 set	 of	 ‘Draft	 Articles	 and	
Commentaries	on	Succession	of	States	in	respect	of	Treaties’	(ILC	Yearbook	1974,	vol.	II/1,	at	174	et	
seq.).	 For	 details	 and	 documents	 see	 the	 ILC’s	 Analytical	 Guide,	 at	
http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/3_2.shtml#top.		
23	See	the	reference	 in	 fn.	2.	 	 	 	 In	parallel,	 the	 ILC	also	worked	on	other	aspects	of	 the	 law	of	State	
succession;	this	led	to	the	adoption	of	the	1983	Vienna	Convention	on	Succession	of	States	in	respect	
of	State	Property,	Archives	and	Debts,	International	Legal	Materials	22	(1983),	306	(not	yet	in	force).		
24 	Nearly	 forty	 years	 after	 its	 adoption,	 the	 Convention	 has	 no	 more	 than	 22	 parties:	 see	
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-
2&chapter=23&lang=en.		
25	In	 its	 written	 submissions	 in	 the	 Gabcikovo	 Nagymaros	 case	 before	 the	 International	 Court	 of	
Justice,	Hungary	argued	 that	 the	1978	Vienna	Convention	was	 "widely	 regarded	as	an	unsuccessful	
exercise	in	international	law-making	…	which	does	not	correspond	to	subsequent	practice":	see	Reply	
of	 Hungary,	 20	 June	 1995	 (http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/10965.pdf),	 at	 173.	 For	 further	
discussion	of	one	of	the	Convention’s	most	controversial	propositions	see	below,	section	4a.		
		 7	
the	 territorial	 transfers	 of	Macao,	 Hong	 Kong	 and	Walvis	 Bay,	 to	 name	 the	most	
prominent	 –	 States	 and	 other	 stakeholders	 have	 drawn	 inspiration	 from	 it;	 but	
perhaps	 not	 much	 more:	 pragmatism,	 rather	 than	 adherence	 to	 abstract	 legal	
propositions,	 has	 been	 the	 guiding	 principle. 26 	The	 result	 is	 a	 legal	 regime	
characterised,	 more	 than	 in	 other	 areas	 of	 international	 law,	 by	 a	 practice	 of	
“diplomatic	bricolage,	 the	collecting	of	bits	and	pieces	 from	normative	materials	…	
lying	around	in	treaties,	doctrinal	writings	and	diplomatic	discourse”.27		
	
b)	Distinguishing	State	Succession	from	Other	Phenomena	
Before	 assessing	 the	work	 of	 the	 ‘diplomatic	bricoleurs’	 in	 the	 field	 of	 investment	
law,	it	is	useful	to	delimit	the	scope	of	application	of	the	regime	of	State	succession.	
While	 the	 preceding	 section	 has	 emphasised	 the	 breadth	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘State	
replacement’	(which	is	at	the	heart	of	the	State	succession	regime),	it	is	important	to	
note	 that	 that	 regime	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 other	 ruptures	 affecting	 treaty	 relations.	
Three	such	other	ruptures	merit	at	least	some	brief	comment.	
	
Changes	not	affecting	a	State’s	legal	personality:	First,	State	succession	needs	to	be	
distinguished	from	changes	that	do	not	affect	the	legal	personality	of	the	State.28	In	
essence,	 where	 a	 State,	 notwithstanding	 changes	 to	 its	 structure	 or	 territory,	
remains	identical,	the	question	of	succession	to	treaties	does	not	arise:	as	the	legal	
personality	of	the	State	remains	the	same,	so	do	 its	treaty	rights	and	obligations.29																																																									
26 	As	 noted	 by	 Zimmermann,	 "recent	 instances	 of	 international	 practice	 [in	 the	 field	 of	 State	
succession]	 …	 have	 not	 followed	 any	 hard	 and	 fast	 legal	 rules":	 A	 Zimmermann,	 The	 International	
Court	 of	 Justice	 and	 State	 Succession	 to	 Treaties:	 Avoiding	 Principled	 Answers	 to	 Questions	 of	
Principle,	in	CJ	Tams/J	Sloan	(eds),	The	Development	of	International	Law	by	the	International	Court	of	
Justice	(2013),	53,	at	54.		
27	M	Koskenniemi,	Report	of	the	Director	of	Studies	of	the	English-Speaking	Section	of	the	Centre,	in	
PM	 Eisemann	 and	 M	 Koskenniemi	 (eds),	 State	 Succession:	 Codification	 Tested	 against	 the	 Facts	
(2000),	65,	at	132.		
28	As	Craven	(n	3)	notes,	the	problem	is	of	“classification	or	taxonomy“,	and	"structural"	in	nature	(at	
146).	For	succinct	accounts	see	Crawford	(n	2),	426-427;	Zimmermann/Devaney	(n	17),	512-516;	for	a	
fuller	 treatment	 see	 Stern	 (n	 17),	 at	 39-86;	W	 Czaplinski,	 La	 continuité,	 l’identité	 et	 la	 succession	
d’Etats,	 Revue	belge	de	droit	 international	26	 (1993),	 375,	 and	K	Marek,	 Identity	 and	Continuity	 of	
States	in	Public	International	Law	(1968).		
29	As	 Zimmermann	 notes,	 "[a]s	 a	 matter	 of	 principle,	 State	 continuity	 and	 State	 succession	 are	
mutually	 exclusive	 concepts":	 A	 Zimmermann,	 Continuity	 of	 States,	 in	Max	 Planck	 Encyclopedia	 of	
Public	International	Law	(www.mpepil.com),	at	para.	6.		
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All	 this	 is	 clear	 in	 theory,	 but	 can	 be	 highly	 problematic	 in	 practice,	 as	 there	 are	
relatively	 few	agreed	criteria	 for	determining	when	a	State	changes	 its	personality:	
to	illustrate,	was	the	Federal	Republic	of	Yugoslavia,	comprising	the	territory	of	the	
former	 Yugoslav	 Republics	 of	 Serbia	 and	 Montenegro,	 identical	 to	 the	 Socialist	
Federal	 Republic	 of	 Yugoslavia	 (SFRY),	 comprised	 of	 Serbia,	 Montenegro,	 Croatia,	
Slovenia,	Macedonia	and	Bosnia	Herzegovina?	Could	Russia	claim	after	1991	claim	to	
be	identical	to	the	Soviet	Union?	Objective	factors,	such	as	the	impact	of	the	change	
on	 a	 State’s	 structure,	 may	 be	 indicative;30	but	 much	 depends	 on	 the	 subjective	
perception	of	the	change,	by	the	State	itself	and	by	the	international	community31	–	
which	 eventually	 decided	 to	 reject	 the	 FRY’s	 claim	 to	 continuity,	 but	 accepted	
Russia’s.32	As	is	clear	from	these	two	examples,	the	proper	legal	assessment	often	is	
the	 result	 of	 a	 lengthy	 process	 of	 claim	 and	 contestation,	 in	 which	 historical	
narratives,	perceptions	of	legitimacy	and	the	views	of	key	players	play	an	important	
role.	 Yet	 while	 indeed	 “precarious”, 33 	the	 distinction	 between	 identity	 and	
succession	remains	fundamental	as	a	matter	of	law.		
	
Regime	change:	Second,	instances	of	State	succession	need	to	be	distinguished	from	
changes	to	the	State’s	internal	system	of	government.	Premised	on	a	change	in	the	
State’s	legal	personality,	the	law	of	State	succession	ignores	ruptures	in	the	domestic	
organisation	of	the	State.34	This	does	not	mean	that	such	ruptures	had	no	impact	on																																																									
30	Stern	provides	a	thorough	analysis	of	international	practice:	see	n	17,	at	68-82.		
31	Zimmermann	and	Devaney	(n	17),	at	515:	“what	often	matters	most	is	not	objective	facts,	such	as	
the	size	of	territory	or	population,	but	rather	to	what	extent	the	claim	to	continuation	of	identity	was	
generally	 accepted	 by	 the	 inter-	 national	 community	 as	 a	 whole,	 including	 international	
organizations”.	
32	For	 contemporary	 perspectives	 see	 R	 Mullerson,	 The	 Continuity	 and	 Succession	 of	 States	 by	
Reference	to	the	Former	USSR	and	Yugoslavia,	International	ad	Comparative	Law	Quarterly	42	(1993),	
473;	M	 Shaw,	 State	 Succession	 Revisited,	 Finnish	 Yearbook	 of	 International	 Law	 5	 (1994),	 34.	 It	 is	
worth	 noting	 that	 in	 the	 case	 concerning	 Application	 of	 the	 International	 Convention	 on	 the	
Elimination	of	All	Forms	of	Racial	Discrimination	(Georgia	v	Russia),	the	International	Court	of	Justice	
referred	 to	 the	 Respondent	 as	 “the	 State	 continuing	 the	 legal	 personality	 of	 the	 Union	 of	 Soviet	
Socialist	Republics”:	ICJ	Reports	2008,	353,	para.	105.		
33	Crawford	(n	2),	427.	
34	Historically,	 claims	 to	discontinuity	 advanced	by	new,	 often	 socialist,	 regimes	 (such	 as	 the	 Soviet	
Union	 in	 1917,	 or	 Cuba	 after	 the	Cuban	 revolution)	 have	met	with	 opposition.	 (Hafner	 and	Nowak	
refer	to	this	as	the	“socialist	aberration”	of	the	clean	slate	theory:	n	17,	at	401).	Introducing	its	Draft	
Articles	on	the	Succession	of	States	in	Respect	to	Treaties,	the	ILC	stated	that	it	had	“concluded	that	it	
was	appropriate	 to	exclude	 from	the	scope	of	 the	draft	articles	problems	of	 succession	arising	as	a	
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the	 State's	 external	 relations:	 the	 more	 drastic	 changes	 in	 fact	 are	 likely	 to	 have	
consequences	 for	 the	 State’s	 approach	 to	 international	 treaties.	 However,	 these	
changes	 will	 result	 from	 re-negotiations	 of	 existing	 treaties	 or	 the	 new	 regime's	
decision	to	suspend	or	terminate	existing	treaties	(which	may	be	valid	or	not),	or	to	
agree	to	new	ones.	They	do	not	result	 from	the	operation	of	rules	governing	State	
succession.			
	
Illegal	occupation	of	territory:	Finally,	the	regime	of	State	succession	to	treaties	does	
not	apply	to	situations	of	illegal	occupation	of	territory.	These	involve	ruptures	of	a	
particular	 kind,	 to	 which	 international	 law	 responds	 with	 particular	 sets	 of	 rules,	
notably	aimed	at	precluding	the	validation,	in	law,	of	the	situation	created	in	fact.35	
As	a	general	principle,	conduct	of	the	occupying	State	is	governed	by	the	regime	of	
belligerent	occupation,	as	well	as	human	rights	 law	and	 international	humanitarian	
law	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 these	 rules	 apply	 extraterritorially.	 The	 regime	 of	 State	
succession	does	not	come	into	play.36	
	
Yet	even	when	instances	of	State	identity,	regime	change	and	illegal	occupation	are	
left	to	a	side,	the	list	of	'proper'	of	State	succession	issues	remains	considerable.	The	
subsequent	 sections	 group	 them	 into	 three	 distinct	 categories,	 which	 take	 up	
internal	 divisions	 within	 the	 applicable	 legal	 regime:	 (i)	Section	 3	 analyses	 the	
																																																																																																																																																														
result	of	changes	of	regime	brought	about	by	social	or	other	forms	of	revolution”	(ILC	Yearbook	1974,	
vol.	II,	at	170).	See	further	Marek	(n	28),	24	et	seq.	
35	Hence	 annexations	 procured	 by	 force	 are	 illegal,	 and	must	 not	 be	 recognised	 as	 lawful	 by	 third	
States:	see	General	Assembly	Resolution	2625	(XXV)	('Friendly	Relations	Declaration’),	principle	I	("No	
territorial	acquisition	resulting	from	the	threat	or	use	of	force	shall	be	recognized	as	legal");	General	
Assembly	Resolution	3314	(XXX)	('Definition	of	Aggression'),	at	Article	5(3)	("No	territorial	acquisition	
or	special	advantage	resulting	from	aggression	is	or	shall	be	recognized	as	lawful");	and	Articles	40,	41	
of	 the	 ILC’s	 Articles	 on	 State	 Responsibility.	 For	 details	 see	R	Hofmann,	Annexation,	 in	Max	Planck	
Encyclopedia	 of	 Public	 International	 Law	 (www.mpepil.com);	 and	 L	Mälksoo,	 Illegal	 Annexation	 on	
State	Continuity	(2003).	
36	According	to	its	Article	6,	the	1978	Vienna	Convention	"applies	only	to	the	effects	of	a	succession	of	
States	occurring	in	conformity	with	international	law";	pursuant	to	Article	40,	ist	provisions	"shall	not	
prejudge	any	question	that	may	arise	in	regard	to	a	treaty	from	the	military	occupation	of	a	territory."	
For	a	detailed	discussion	see	Marek	(n	28),	73	et	seq.		Examining	a	recent	(on-going)	conflict,	Thomas	
Grant	 states	 that	 "there	 is	 no	 indication	 that	Ukraine	would	 accept	 that	 a	 succession	of	 States	has	
taken	place	in	respect	of	Crimea	(or	any	other	territory	recognized	to	fall	within	the	State	borders	of	
Ukraine)":	see	his	Aggression	Against	Ukraine:	Territory,	Responsibility,	and	International	Law	(2015),	
at	94.		
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position	of	new	States	vis-à-vis	 the	 ICSID	Convention	(as	the	most	relevant	dispute	
settlement	 framework).	 (ii)	Section	 4	 inquires	 whether	 new	 States	 are	 bound	 by	
bilateral	 investment	 treaties	 (‘BITs’)	 concluded	by	 their	predecessors.	 (iii)	Section	5	
looks	 at	 the	 particular	 problems	 of	 territorial	 cessions	 and	 their	 impact	 on	
investment	 treaties.	 Finally,	 section	 6	 offers	 a	 number	 of	 general	 conclusions	 and	
highlights	open	questions.	
	
3.	New	States	and	ICSID	Membership	
As	a	threshold	issue,	questions	of	succession	arise	with	respect	to	membership	in	the	
ICSID	 Convention	 regime.	 Can	 a	 successor	 State	 simply	 automatically	 follow	 the	
predecessor	State’s	ICSID	membership	and	exercise	membership	rights?	Conversely,	
can	investors	lodge	claims	against	successor	States	if	their	predecessor	had	been	an	
ICSID	 party?	 Or	 do	 successor	 States	 only	 become	 bound	 by	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	
once	they	have	joined	the	regime	as	a	new	treaty	party,	in	line	with	the	procedures	
set	 out	 in	 Articles	 67	 and	 68?	 The	 proceedings	 in	 the	 case	 of	MNSS	B.V.	 et.	 al.	 v.	
Montenegro,	 a	 BIT-based	 arbitration	 brought	 against	 Montenegro	 in	 2011, 37	
illustrates	that	these	questions	are	not	of	a	purely	academic	character:	Montenegro	
had	not,	at	the	time	of	the	request	for	arbitration,	ratified	the	ICSID	Convention	in	its	
own	 right;	 but	 the	 Socialist	 Federal	Republic	of	 Yugoslavia	 (from	which	 Serbia	 and	
Montenegro	 emerged)	 had.38	So	 was	 Montenegro,	 in	 2011,	 to	 be	 treated	 as	 a	
‘Contracting	 State’	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 Article	 25	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention?39	The	
subsequent	 sections	 address	 this,	 and	 related,	 questions	 by	 outlining	 the	 general	
regime	governing	succession	to	membership	(a)	and	applying	it	to	the	special	case	of	
ICSID	(b).																																																										
37	Information	provided	on	the	ICSID	website	is	limited;	but	see	‘Montenegro	to	Face	Second	Known	
Investment	Treaty	Claim,	This	Time	Over	Bankrupt	Steelworks’,	 Investment	Arbitration	Reporter,	10	
December	 2012,	 at	 	 http://www.iareporter.com/articles/montenegro-to-face-second-known-
investment-treaty-claim-this-time-over-bankrupt-steelworks/.		
38	Montenegro	signed	 the	 ICSID	Convention	on	19	 July	2012	and	ratified	 it	on	10	April	2013.	 In	 line	
with	 Article	 68	 of	 the	 Convention,	 it	 therefore	 became	 bound	 on	 10	 May	 2013.	 Details	 on	
Montenegro’s	membership,	and	 that	of	other	contracting	parties,	are	 listed	 in	Doc.	 ICSID/3	 ('List	of	
Member	 States’),	 at	https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/about/Pages/Database-of-Member-
States.bak.aspx.		
39	As	Schreuer,	Malintoppi,	Reinisch	and	Sinclair	note,	"[p]articipation	in	the	Convention	of	the	State	
party	to	proceedings	is	an	absolute	requirement":	see	The	ICSID	Convention.	A	Commentary	(2nd	edn.,	
2011),	at	144.	
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a)	The	General	Regime:	Between	Orthodox	Principle	and	Pragmatic	Application	
On	the	face	of	it,	membership	in	the	ICSID	Convention	could	be	looked	at	as	regular	
question	of	succession	to	treaties.	However,	it	concerns	a	treaty	of	a	particular	kind,	
namely	one	establishing	an	 international	organization,	viz.	 the	 International	Centre	
for	 the	 Settlement	 of	 Investment	 Disputes	 (‘Centre’).	 While	 the	 Centre	 is	 closely	
affiliated	 with	 the	World	 Bank	 and	while	 its	 activities,	 compared	 to	 that	 of	 other	
international	 organisations,	 are	 not	 the	most	 visible,	 it	 possesses	 an	 autonomous	
legal	 personality 40 	and	 enjoys	 privileges	 and	 immunities	 commonly	 granted	 to	
international	 organisations.41	As	 for	 the	 ‘inner	 life’	 of	 the	 Centre,	 once	 they	 have	
joined	 the	Convention,	 contracting	parties	participate	 in	 the	Centre’s	deliberations	
and	decisions,	notably	through	the	Administrative	Council;42	they	are	members	of	an	
international	organization	as	much	as	parties	to	a	multilateral	treaty.	
	
All	this	has	implications	for	the	applicable	rules	on	State	succession.43	Because	of	the	
higher	level	of	integration	within	international	organizations,	the	orthodox	approach	
has	 long	 treated	 membership	 as	 a	 special	 category	 of	 treaty	 participation:	 a	
																																																								
40	See	Article	18	of	the	ICSID	Convention.	The	Report	of	the	Executive	Directors	leaves	no	doubt	in	this	
respect;	it	states:	“The	Convention	establishes	the	International	Centre	for	Settlement	of	Investment	
Disputes	as	an	autonomous	international	institution	(Articles	18–24)"	(in	ICSID	Reports,	vol.	1,	at	26).	
41 	Such	 as:	 immunity	 from	 suit,	 tax	 exemptions	 and	 the	 like:	 see	 Articles	 19-24	 of	 the	 ICSID	
Convention.	
42	See	 notably	 Articles	 4,	 6,	 10	 and	 17	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 (regulating	 the	 composition	 and	
functions	of	the	Administrative	Council);	and	further	Article	7	(procedure)	and	Article	13	(designation	
of	panelists).		
43	For	 details	 on	 succession	 to	 membership	 see	 K	 Bühler,	 State	 Succession	 and	 Membership	 in	
International	Organizations:	Legal	Theories	Versus	Political	Pragmatism	(2001);	 id.,	State	Succession,	
Identity/Continuity	and	Membership	in	The	United	Nations,	in	Koskenniemi/Eisemann	(n	27),	187;	HG	
Schermer	and	NM	Blokker,	 International	 Institutional	 Law	 (4th	ed.,	2003),	81-91;	and,	more	briefly,	
Crawford	(n	2),	442-443.	
From	 the	 beginning	 of	 its	 work	 on	 questions	 of	 succession,	 the	 ILC	 had	 separated	 questions	 of	
membership	 in	 international	 organisations	 from	 the	 other	 aspects	 of	 succession	 to	 treaties:	 see	
Report	by	Manfred	Lachs,	 ILC	Yearbook	1963,	vol.	 II,	260,	at	261	(para.	13).	Article	4(a)	of	the	1978	
Vienna	Convention	recognises	the	special	character	of	membership	rights:	it	clarifies	that,	as	regards	
the	 acquisition	 of	 membership	 in	 international	 organisations	 (which	 could	 be	 seen	 a	 question	 of	
succession	to	the	constitutive	treaty),	the	1978	Vienna	Convention	is	“without	prejudice	to	the	rules	
concerning	 acquisition	 of	 membership	 and	 without	 prejudice	 to	 any	 other	 relevant	 rules	 of	 the	
organization”.	
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“personal	 status” 44 	not	 easily	 transferred	 unless	 explicitly	 envisaged	 in	 the	
organization’s	 constituent	documents.45	Pursuant	 to	 this	 "traditional	axiom	of	non-
succession	 to	 membership”, 46 	new	 States	 have	 regularly	 been	 expected	 to	 go	
through	the	organisation’s	admissions	process	and	join	as	new	members.47	
	
The	orthodox	approach	has	however	not	been	followed	through	rigorously;	"political	
pragmatism"	has	(to	adapt	the	subtitle	of	a	detailed	study)	to	some	extent	mollified	
the	strictures	of	"legal	theories"	or	“traditional	axioms”.48	Pragmatic	considerations	
have	e.g.	led	international	organisations	to	accept	a	claim	to	continued	membership,	
where	a	new	State	had	been	established	through	a	fusion	of	previous	members	(as	
in	 the	 case	 of	 Yemen,	 which	 came	 into	 existence	 in	 1990	when	 North	 and	 South	
Yemen	 merged),	 or	 where	 a	 State	 could	 credibly	 claim	 to	 revert	 to	 a	 prior	
membership	 status	 (e.g.	 Syria	 and	 Egypt	 after	 the	 dissolution	 of	 their	 short-lived	
merger	into	the	United	Arab	Republic).49	The	practice	of	certain	financial	institutions	
(including	the	World	Bank)	seems	equally	to	have	been	driven	by	pragmatism	rather	
than	 strict	 application	 of	 principle:	 desirous	 to	 preserve	 assets	 deposited	 by	
predecessor	States,	the	IMF	and	the	World	Bank,	during	the	1990s,	e.g.	treated	the	
Czech	and	Slovak	Republics,	as	well	as	the	various	States	emerging	during	the	break-																																																								
44	Crawford	 (n	 2),	 443;	 K	 Zemanek,	 State	 Succession	 after	 Decolonization,	 Recueil	 des	 Cours	 161	
(1965),	 182,	 at	 253	 (“[m]embership	 of	 international	 organizations	 is	 a	 personal	 right	 to	 which,	 in	
principle,	succession	is	not	possible”);	CW	Jenks,	State	Succession	in	Respect	of	Law-Making	Treaties,	
British	Yearbook	of	International	Law	29	(1952),	105,	at	134.	In	 its	Report	(n	17)	the	ILA	speaks	of	a	
"coloration	fortement	personnelle"	(at	43).	
45	Only	 in	 rare	 instances	do	constitutive	documents	expressly	permit	 the	acquisition	of	membership	
by	way	of	 succession,	usually	 for	newly	 independent	States	 that	had	possessed	some	 form	of	prior	
status	within	the	organisation:	see	e.g.	the	1953	International	Sugar	Agreement	(Article	66),	and	the	
1960	(Second)	International	Tin	Agreement	(Article	XXII(6).		A	right	to	succeed	to	the	1899	and	1907	
Hague	 Dispute	 Settlement	 Conventions	 was	 created	 by	 a	 unanimous	 decision	 of	 the	 PCA	
Administrative	Council	in	1959.	For	details	and	references	see	Bühler	(n	43),	26-30.	
46	Bühler	(n	43),	30.		
47	This	 approach	was	 followed	within	 organisations	 with	 a	 formal	 process	 of	 admission,	 as	 well	 as	
those	 that	 permitted	 admission	 by	 virtue	 of	 a	 unilateral	 act:	 see	 Bühler	 (n	 43),	 31-32;	
Schermers/Blokker	(n	43),	90.	
48	Cf.	the	subtitle	of	Bühler’s	detailed	study	(n	43).	
49	See	 Schermers/Blokker	 (n	 XX),	 82:	 "In	 these	 cases	 [Yemen,	 United	 Arab	 Republic,	 etc],	 the	 new	
state	 replaced	 the	 old	 ones	 as	 a	 member	 of	 the	 international	 organizations	 in	 which	 they	 had	
participated.	No	 new	 admission	was	 required,	 not	 even	where	 one	 of	 the	 constituent	 parts	 of	 the	
federation	 had	 not	 previously	 been	 a	 member	 of	 the	 organization”	 (footnote	 omitted).	 Bühler	
provides	details	(n	43,	at	50	et	seq.).	
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up	 of	 Yugoslavia,	 as	 successors	 of	 the	 CSFR	 and	 the	 SFRY.50	Drawing	 on	 this	more	
recent	practice,	commentators	have	put	forward	distinctions	based	on	the	character	
of	the	organization	concerned	–	excluding	succession	to	membership	within	political	
organisations	 emphasising	 close	 integration,	 while	 admitting	 it	 in	 principle	 for	
'universal-technical	 organisations’	 aimed	 at	 wide	 participation. 51 	Yet	 while	 that	
distinction	may	serve	as	a	useful	guideline	flexibility	 is	the	defining	feature	of	 legal	
regime:	 largely	unconstrained	by	 firm	 rules,	 international	organisations	are	 free	 to	
determine	issues	of	membership	in	light	of	their	institutional	preferences.52		
	
b)	ICSID	Practice:	Orthodoxy	Affirmed		
Against	 this	background,	 ICSID’s	 institutional	practice	merits	 attention.	 It	 is,	 as	has	
been	noted,	“scant"53	(as	 in	many	 instances,	 the	respective	predecessor	States	had	
not	been	ICSID	parties,	and	hence	succession	was	not	an	option54).	But	contrary	to	
views	 expressed	 by	 commentators, 55 	the	 scant	 practice	 yields	 relatively	
straightforward	results.	Although	ICSID	aspires	to	universal	membership	and	allows	
World	Bank	members	to	join	without	undergoing	any	admissions	procedure,56	it	has																																																									
50	This	was	widely	considered	to	be	a	break	with	the	orthodox	approach:	see	e.g.	PR	Williams,	State	
Succession	and	the	 International	Financial	 Institutions:	Political	Criteria	v.	Protection	of	Outstanding	
Financial	Obligations,	International	and	Comparative	Law	Quarterly	43	(1994),	776,	807:	"As	a	result	
of	 the	 break-up	 of	 Yugoslavia	 and	 Czechoslovakia,	 the	 IMF	 and	World	 Bank	 have	 for	 the	 first	 time	
developed	 a	 conditional	 succession	 approach	 to	 address	 the	 questions	 posed	by	 the	 break-up	of	 a	
member	 State.”	 According	 to	 Oeter,	 “State	 practice	 in	 this	 field	 seems	 to	 differ	 considerably	 from	
state	practice	concerning	membership	 in	other	organizations	 -	a	 fact	 largely	due	 to	different	voting	
procedures	and	different	states	of	interest	dominating	in	these	organizations”:	in	ILA	Report	(n	17),	at	
43.		
51	See	e.g.	Bühler	in	Koskenniemi/Eisemann	(n	43),	at	227-233.	
52	As	noted	by	the	ILA	in	its	2008	Report,	this	limits	the	purchase	of	general	rules:	“Tout	conflit	entre	
les	 règles	de	 la	 succession	d’Etat	 et	 toute	 règle	 relative	 à	 l’acquisition	de	 la	qualité	de	membre	ou	
toute	autre	règle	pertinente	de	 l’organisation	 -	disposition	qui	 inclut	 les	règles	 issues	de	 la	pratique	
des	 organisations	 -	 se	 résout	 en	 faveur	 de	 ces	 dernières.	 C’est	 l’intérêt	 de	 l’organisation	 et	 son	
équilibre	 institutionnel	 qui	 sont	 protégés	 et	 qui	 doivent	 l’emporter	 sur	 l’intérêt	 individuel	 de	 l’Etat	
successeur“	(n	17,	at	46)		
53	Schreuer	et	al.	(n	39),	at	169	(footnote	401).		
54	This	e.g.	applies	to	the	Soviet	Union	and	Ethiopia	(in	relation	to	Eritrea).	Insofar	as	colonial	powers,	
pursuant	to	Article	70,	applied	the	ICSID	Convention	to	overseas	territories	for	whose	representation	
they	bore	responsibility	(e.g.	the	Netherlands	in	respect	of	Suriname	and	the	Netherlands	Antilles),	no	
attempt	has	been	made	to	'upgrade’	the	status	of	these	territories	to	full	membership.		
55	Contrast	e.g.	JA	Fratermann	Secession,	State	Succession	and	International	Arbitration,	available	at	
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2313401	(at	19).		
56	Article	67	runs	as	follows:	"This	Convention	shall	be	open	for	signature	on	behalf	of	States	members	
of	 the	Bank.	 It	 shall	also	be	open	 for	signature	on	behalf	of	any	other	State	which	 is	a	party	 to	 the	
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clearly	 followed	 the	 orthodox	 approach	 precluding	 succession	 to	 membership.	
Invariably,	new	States	 that	have	 joined	the	 ICSID	Convention	have	done	so	as	new	
members,	 even	 though	 this	 opened	 up	 a	 time-gap	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 ICSID	
regime.57	This	practice	has	been	followed	in	relation	to	the	following	new	States:58		
- the	 Czech	 and	 Slovak	 Republics	 (which	 joined	 as	 new	parties	 in	 1993/1994	
rather	than	continuing	the	CSFR’s	prior	membership),		
- the	 agreed	 successor	 States	 of	 the	 SFRY	 (itself	 a	 first-generation	 ICSID	
member	since	1967),	namely	Slovenia	(admitted	as	a	new	member	in	1994),	
Bosnia	 and	 Herzegovina	 (1997),	 Croatia	 (1998)	 and	 the	 Former	 Yugoslav	
Republic	of	Macedonia	(1998);	
- Serbia,	 which	 joined	 as	 a	 new	 member	 in	 2006	 after	 the	 separation	 of	
Montenegro	and	after	 it	had	given	up	 its	earlier	claim	to	continue	 the	 legal	
personality	of	the	SFRY;	subsequently	by		
- Montenegro,	which	(as	noted	above)	joined	in	2013,	after	its	separation	from	
Serbia	 and	 Montenegro;	 as	 well	 as	 Kosovo	 and	 South	 Sudan,	 which	
unsurprisingly	did	not	 seek	 to	continue	 the	membership	 status	of	Serbia	or	
Sudan,	but	instead	joined	as	new	parties	in	2009	and	2012,	respectively.		
	
The	 brief	 summary	 of	 practice	reflects	 the	 continued	 appeal	 of	 the	 ‘traditional	
axiom’59:	 even	 though	 membership	 rights	 and	 duties	 are	 relatively	 limited,	 ICSID	
membership	 is	 regarded	 as	 a	 personal	 link	with	 the	organization	 that	 a	 new	State	
needs	to	establish	in	its	own	right.	Succession	has	neither	been	sought	nor	granted;	
in	fact,	new	States	often	have	joined	ICSID	quickly	so	to	signal	their	integration	into	
the	 international	 economic	 community	 or	 –	 particularly	 in	 cases	 of	 contested	
statehood,	such	as	Kosovo’s	–	their	status	as	a	member	of	the	community	of	nations.																																																																																																																																																															
Statute	of	the	International	Court	of	Justice	and	which	the	Administrative	Council,	by	a	vote	of	two-
thirds	of	its	members,	shall	have	invited	to	sign	the	Convention."	Schreuer	et	al.	(n	39)	note	that	initial	
drafts	 envisaged	 a	more	 open	 regime	 that	would	 have	 opened	 the	 Convention	 for	 signature	 by	 all	
sovereign	States;	this	however,	was	resisted	by	representatives	of	divided	States	(at	1267-1268).		
57	According	to	Article	68(2),	the	Convention	enters	 into	force	for	them	30	days	after	the	deposit	of	
their	instrument	of	ratification,	accession	or	approval.	Until	that	date,	the	new	State	therefore	is	not	a	
“Contracting	State”	for	the	purposes	of	Article	25	of	the	Convention.	
58	The	 following	 information	 is	 based	 on	 information	 provided	 by	 ICSID:	 see	 Doc.	 ICSID/3	 (which	
contains	further	details	on	membership).		
59	Bühler	(n	43),	30.	
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ICSID’s	handling	of	the	MNSS	B.V.	et.	al.	v.	Montenegro	case	confirms	this	approach,	
and	 illustrates	 its	 implications.	 Having	 requested	 arbitration	 under	 the	 ICSID	
Convention,	the	claimants	realised	that	Montenegro	was	not	a	‘Contracting	State’	in	
the	sense	of	Article	25	of	 the	 ICSID	Convention	and,	 irrespective	of	whether	 it	had	
consented	 to	 arbitration	 in	 an	 applicable	 BIT,	 could	 not	 be	 a	 respondent	 in	 ICSID	
proceedings.	 According	 to	 the	 Investment	 Arbitration	 Reporter’s	 account,	 "[t]he	
claimants	therefore	requested	ICSID’s	approval	to	make	use	of	the	Additional	Facility	
Rules,	 which	 was	 granted	 on	 7	 December	 2011.	 After	 delays	 of	 nearly	 a	 year,	 a	
formal	notice	of	arbitration	was	 lodged	 in	November	of	2012,	and	 it	 is	understood	
that	ICSID	ultimately	registered	the	dispute	under	the	Additional	Facility	Rules	on	6	
December	2012.”60			
	
	
4.	New	States	and	Bilateral	Investment	Treaties		
As	 is	clear	 from	the	preceding	section,	a	new	State’s	decision	not	 to	 join	 the	 ICSID	
regime	 need	 not	 be	 fatal,	 as	 investors	 can	 explore	 other	 jurisdictional	 options	
(Additional	 Facility	 proceedings,	 UNCITRAL	 proceedings,	 etc.).	 Such	 proceedings,	
however,	presuppose	that	the	new	State	has	consented	to	some	form	of	investment	
arbitration.	 The	 subsequent	 considerations	 focus	 on	 the	 most	 relevant	 basis	 of	
consent,	 namely	 bilateral	 investment	 treaties;	 they	 ask	 whether	 new	 States	 are	
bound	by	investment	agreements	concluded	by	their	predecessor.	This	question	has	
arisen,	and	continues	to	arise,	quite	frequently,	as	all	new	States	that	have	emerged	
since	the	1990s	have	had	to	 take	a	position	on	the	 fate	of	prior	BITs.	To	 illustrate,	
based	 on	 publicly	 available	 information,61	at	 the	 time	 of	 its	 demise	 the	 Czech	 and	
Slovak	Federal	Republic	(‘CSFR’)	was	party	to	16	BITs;	38	BITs	were	in	force	for	Serbia	
and	Montenegro	when	Montenegro	separated	from	it	in	2006;62	while	Sudan,	upon																																																									
60 	See	 http://www.iareporter.com/articles/montenegro-to-face-second-known-investment-treaty-
claim-this-time-over-bankrupt-steelworks/	(December	2012).		
61 	See	 the	 information	 on	 applicable	 BITs	 (and	 dates	 of	 their	 entry	 into	 force)	 provided	 at	
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu.		
62	Serbia	and	Montenegro	was	established	on	27	April	1992,	as	 the	 ‘Federal	Republic	of	Yugoslavia’	
(‘FRY’),	proclaimed	on	the	territory	of	two	of	the	constituent	parts	of	the	territory	of	Yugoslavia,	i.e.	
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the	independence	of	South	Sudan,	had	entered	into	at	least63	13	BITs.	With	respect	
to	all	of	these	–	and	the	many	more	BITs	at	stake	during	the	break-up	of	the	former	
Yugoslavia	 and	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 etc.	 –	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 assessed	 whether	 the	
respective	successor	States,	after	independence,	are	bound	by	treaties	concluded	by	
their	predecessors.64	
	
The	 question	 of	 succession	 to	 treaties	 has	 long	 been,	 and	 remains,	 highly	
controversial.	It	is	here	that	the	major	debate	between	‘strict	continuity’	and	‘clean	
slate’	 approaches	 has	 historically	 been	 played	 out.	 The	 1978	 Vienna	 Convention’s	
attempt	 to	provide	a	 strong	default	 rule	 favouring	 continuity	has	met	with	 limited	
success.	 Rather	 than	 endorsing	 one	 guiding	 principle,	 practice	 and	 debates	 since	
1978	reflect	a	trend	towards	process	(encouraging	negotiated	agreements	on	treaty	
succession)	and	flexibility	(proposing	differentiated	solutions	for	different	categories	
of	 treaties).	 The	 subsequent	 sections	 outline	 these	 developments	 (a)	 and	 indicate	
how	they	affect	the	status	of	new	States	with	respect	to	bilateral	investment	treaties	
entered	into	by	their	predecessors	(b).		
	
a)	 The	 General	 Regime:	 Automatic	 Succession,	 Its	 Discontents,	 and	 the	 Turn	 to	
Process	and	Flexibility	
The	general	 regime	 is	not	easily	summarised,	as	 it	 is	 rather	 in	a	state	of	 flux	and	a	
number	of	core	propositions	 remain	uncertain.	This,	 in	 turn,	 is	a	 result	of	an	over-
ambitious	 attempt	 at	 codification	 based	 on	 overarching	 principle,	 and	 a	 body	 of	
practice	 favouring	 case-by-case	 solutions.	 The	 1978	 Vienna	 Convention	 stands	 for	
the	first	approach.	It	set	out	a	relatively	straightforward	rule:	according	to	its	Article																																																																																																																																																															
Serbia	 and	 Montenegro.	 In	 2003,	 the	 name	 of	 FRY	 was	 amended	 to	 ‘State	 Union	 of	 Serbia	 and	
Montenegro’.	 In	2006,	Monetenegro	separated	 from	that	Union	 to	 form	an	 independent	State.	For	
reasons	of	 simplicity,	 the	 text	uses	 'Serbia	and	Montenegro’	 to	describe	 the	State	existing	between	
1992-2006.			
63	According	to	UNCTAD’s	recent	country	study,	the	figure	is	significantly	higher:	see	Investment	Policy	
Review:	 Sudan	 (http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2014d5_en.pdf,	 at	 54),	 which	 lists	
21	BITs.		
64	It	is	worth	noting	in	passing	that,	irrespective	of	debates	about	the	level	of	customary	protection,	in	
investment	 law,	 it	 is	protection	by	 treaty	 that	matters,	 as	only	 the	 treaty	will	 typically	 confer	upon	
claimants	a	right	to	raise	treaty	violations	before	arbitral	tribunals,	and	as	that	right	will	be	restricted	
to	 treaty	breaches.	As	 a	 consequence,	 one	of	 the	 common	arguments	 in	 succession	debates	 -	 that	
customary	international	law	would	offer	continuous	protection	-	provides	no	easy	way	out.	
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34,	new	States	–	whether	seceding	from	existing	States	or	emerging	in	processes	of	
dismemberment	–	are	bound	by	all	treaties	binding	upon	their	predecessors.65	There	
are,	 to	 be	 sure,	 nuances.	 Importantly,	 the	 rule	 of	 automatic	 succession	 applies	 by	
default.	States	can	always	agree	otherwise	(Article	34(2)(a));	and	new	States	do	not	
automatically	 succeed	 if	 "the	 application	 of	 the	 [prior]	 treaty	 in	 respect	 of	 the	
successor	State	would	be	incompatible	with	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	treaty	or	
would	radically	change	the	conditions	for	 its	operation"	(Article	34(2)(b)).66	What	 is	
more,	 the	 Convention	 adopts	 a	 very	 different	 approach	 for	 newly	 independent	
States	that	have	obtained	independence	from	colonial	rule:	these	remain	bound	by	
localized,	 territorially-grounded	 treaties,67 	but	 otherwise	 can	 start	 with	 a	 ‘clean	
slate’.68		
	
Yet	 notwithstanding	 these	 nuances,	 the	 Convention's	 approach	 is	 surprisingly	
straightforward.	 Outside	 the	 colonial	 context,	 and	 outside	 the	 relatively	 narrow	
exception	of	Article	34(2)(b),	new	States	are	presumed	to	continue	all	 treaty	rights	
and	 obligations	 of	 their	 predecessors,	 irrespective	 of	 whether	 these	 derive	 from	
multilateral	or	bilateral	agreements.	This	no	doubt	has	the	appeal	of	simplicity,	but	
in	retrospect,	 it	seems	clear	that,	 for	a	treaty	seeking	to	attract	wide	participation,	
the	 1978	 Vienna	 Convention	may	 have	 adopted	 too	 straightforward	 an	 approach.	
Ever	since	draft	provisions	foreshadowing	Article	34	appeared	during	the	1970s,	the																																																									
65	The	crucial	provision	is	Article	34(1)(a),	which	provides:	"When	a	part	or	parts	of	the	territory	of	a	
State	separate	to	form	one	or	more	States,	whether	or	not	the	predecessor	State	continues	to	exist:	
(a)	any	treaty	in	force	at	the	date	of	the	succession	of	States	in	respect	of	the	entire	territory	of	the	
predecessor	 State	 continues	 in	 force	 in	 respect	 of	 each	 successor	 State	 so	 formed…".	According	 to	
Zimmermann,	 the	 question	 addressed	 by	 Article	 34	 "may	 be	 considered	 the	 most	 controversial	
question	within	the	law	of	state	succession	to	treaties":	Zimmermann,	in	Tams/Sloan	(n	26),	59.	
66	Article	34(2)(b).		
67	Articles	11	and	12;	and	see	Crawford	(n	2),	439-440.	The	ICJ	affirmed	the	customary	status	of	Article	
12	in	the	Gabcikovo	Nagymaros	case:	see	ICJ	Reports	1997,	7,	at	para.	123.		
68	See	Article	16,	which	runs	as	follows:	"A	newly	independent	State	is	not	bound	to	maintain	in	force,	
or	to	become	a	party	to,	any	treaty	by	reason	only	of	the	fact	that	at	the	date	of	the	succession	of	
States	 the	 treaty	was	 in	 force	 in	 respect	of	 the	 territory	 to	which	 the	 succession	of	States	 relates."	
According	 to	 Article	 24,	 bilateral	 treaties	 are	 "considered	 as	 being	 in	 force	 between	 a	 newly	
independent	State	and	 the	other	State	party	when:	 (a)	 they	expressly	 so	agree;	or	 (b)	by	 reason	of	
their	conduct	they	are	to	be	considered	as	having	so	agreed".	For	comment	see	Hafner/Novak	(n	17),	
409-410;	and	Zimmermann/Devaney	(n	17),	at	518	(arguing	that,	during	the	decolonization	process,	
"the	 universal	 succession	 to	 obligations	 of	 previous	 colonial	 powers	 was	 seen	 as	 completely	
irreconcilable	 ….	 [this]	 ultimately	 resulted	 in	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	 special	 regime	 for	 newly	
independent	States	in	the	VCSST").	
		 18	
automaticity	principle	has	been	widely	criticised	as	overly	broad	(failing	to	reflect	the	
diverse	practice	of	States)	and	as	unjust	(based,	as	it	 is,	on	a	categorical	distinction	
between	newly-independent	and	other	successor	States).69	Resistance	to	automatic	
succession	in	fact	is	said	to	be	a	relevant	factor	explaining	the	low	acceptance	rate	of	
the	1978	Vienna	Convention	as	a	treaty.70		
	
Given	 these	 concerns,	 it	 comes	 as	 no	 surprise	 that	 Article	 34	 has	 had	 a	 limited	
impact	 on	 international	 practice.	 In	 fact,	 there	 is	 widespread	 agreement	 that	
international	 practice	 since	 1978	 does	 not	 bear	 out	 a	 general	 rule	 of	 automatic	
succession	for	all	treaties.71	Rather	than	relying	on	the	operation	of	one	overarching	
principle,	 States	 have	 sought	 actively	 to	 shape	 the	 fate	 of	 ‘their’	 treaty	 rights	 and	
obligations	 post	 independence.	 The	 various	 State	 successions	 of	 the	 1990s	 in	
particular	resulted	in	rich	body	of	treaty	practice,	including	unilateral	declarations	by	
successor	States,	agreements	with	their	treaty	partners,	and	depositary	statements,	
which	 provide	 guidance	 on	 the	 fate	 of	 specific	 treaties.72	This	 practice	 has	 usually	
accommodated	a	general	desire	to	avoid	ruptures;	as	a	consequence,	in	the	majority	
of	instances,	the	States	involved	in	negotiations	have	sought	to	ensure	the	stability	
of	 treaty	 relations.73	But	 this	overarching	goal	has	been	 reached	 in	different	ways,	
and	pursued	with	different	degrees	of	vigour.		
																																																									
69	See	e.g.	Crawford	 (n	2),	438-439;	Hafner/Novak	 (n	17),	413-414;	A	Aust,	Modern	Treaty	 Law	and	
Practice	(2rd	edn.,	2007),	368-369;	D	Vagts,	State	Succession:	The	Codifiers’	View,	Virginia	Journal	of	
International	Law	33	(1993),	275,	at	283;	Dumberry	(n	XX),	78	("both	incoherent	and	unjustifiable“).	
O’Connell’s	 criticism	 of	 the	 Convention	was	 particualrly	 trenchant;	 to	 him,	 "this	 particular	 essay	 in	
refashioning	the	 law	was	marred	from	its	 inception	by	a	preoccupation	with	the	special	problem	of	
decolonisation,	around	which	myth	and	emotion	have	accumulated	 like	mists	 in	 the	marsh,	 so	 that	
the	 whole	 context	 became	 intellectually	 distorted":	 see	 DP	 O’Connell,	 Reflections	 on	 the	 State	
Succession	Convention,	Zeitschrift	für	ausländisches	öffentliches	Recht	du	Völkerrecht	39	(1979),	725,	
at	726.		
70	Vagts	(n	69),	287-288.	
71	See	e.g.	Crawford	(n	2),	438;	J	Klabbers,	Cat	on	a	Hot	Tin	Roof:	The	World	Court,	State	Succession,	
and	the	Gabcikovo-Nagvmaros	Case,	Leiden	Journal	of	International	Law	11	(1998),	345,	at	348-349.	
72	In	 its	 Report,	 the	 ILA	 made	 the	 point	 very	 clearly,	 when	 noting	 that	 negotiations	 are	 the	 most	
common	means	of	addressing	succcession	issues	(n	17,	at	27):	"la	pratique	de	la	négociation	prévaut	
concernant	la	succession	en	matière	de	traités".		
73	According	to	the	ILA,	negotiations	proceed	from	a	‘presumption	of	treaty	continuity’:	see	ILA	Report	
(n	17,	at	27):	"la	présomption	de	la	continuité	est	la	prémisse	fondamentale	en	matière	de	succession	
d'Etats	-	afin	de	sauvegarder	la	stabilité	des	relations	internationales".	
		 19	
A	 case-by-case	 handling	 of	 succession	 issues,	which	 has	 been	 aptly	 described	 as	 a	
turn	 from	 ‘substance’	 (or	 substantive	 legal	 principle)	 to	 ‘procedure’	 (or	 process),74	
can	no	doubt	clarify	the	status	of	particular	treaties.	However,	it	has	left	the	general	
regime	 in	 a	 state	 of	 flux:	 outside	 party	 agreement	 on	 the	 continuity	 (or	 dis-
continuity)	of	a	given	treaty,	there	is	a	rather	large	grey	zone	of	uncertainty.	At	the	
same	time,	the	more	recent	debate	reflects	a	desire	for	greater	differentiation	and	
flexibility:	 while	 terms	 such	 as	 ‘strict	 continuity’	 and	 ‘clean	 slate’	 remain	 popular,	
practice	 has	 sought	 to	 explore	 "more	 nuanced	 solutions".75	For	 present	 purposes,	
two	such	“nuanced	solutions”	–	both	of	which	point	 to	a	more	flexible	handling	of	
succession	issues	–	are	of	particular	relevance.		
	
A	first	approach	proceeds	from	a	distinction	between	different	categories	of	treaties.	
While	a	general	rule	of	automatic	succession	for	all	treaties	(as	envisaged	by	Article	
34	of	the	1978	Vienna	Convention)	seems	overly	ambitious,	practice	might	support	a	
more	 restrictive	 rule	 requiring	 new	 States	 to	 succeed	 to	 major	 multilateral	
conventions	formulating	‘gold	standards’	of	international	relations,	in	which	there	is	
a	 clear	 community	 interest	 in	 automatic	 succession.76	For	 universal	 human	 rights	
agreements	 in	 particular,	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that,	 	 as	 "[t]he	 rights	 enshrined	 in	
[human	rights	agreements]	belong	 to	 the	people	 ...,	once	 the	people	are	accorded	
the	protection	of	the	rights	...,	such	protection	devolves	with	territory	and	continues	
to	 belong	 to	 them,	 notwithstanding	...	 State	 succession".77	By	 contrast,	 this	 first	
approach	 has	 tended	 to	 view	 bilateral	 treaties	 as	 mere	 inter-party	 bargains,	
dominated	 by	 the	 personal	 element	 and	 of	 an	 “essentially	 voluntary	 character".78																																																									
74	Koskenniemi	(n	27),	69.	
75	Zimmermann,	EPIL	(n	17),	para.	5.	See	also	Zimmermann/Devaney	(n	17,	at	516):	"false	dichotomy”.				
76	The	different	views	on	 this	matter	are	 reflected	 in	MT	Kamminga,	State	Succession	 in	Respect	of	
Human	 Rights	 Treaties,	 European	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 7	 (1996),	 469;	 A	 Rasulov,	 Revisiting	
State	 Succession	 to	 Humanitarian	 Treaties:	 Is	 There	 a	 Case	 for	 Automaticity?,	 European	 Journal	 of	
International	Law	14	(2003),	141;	Zimmermann/Devaney	(n	17),	at	533-536;	and	Aust	(n	69),	at	371-
372.		
77	Human	Rights	Committee,	General	Comment	No.	26	 (61),	UN	Doc.	CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1	
(1997),	 at	 para.	 4.	 While	 enjoying	 considerable	 support,	 practice	 regarding	 major	 multilateral	
conventions	 is	 not	 unequivocal,	 and	 the	 ICJ,	 in	 the	 various	 Genocide	 cases	 submitted	 to	 it,	 has	
refrained	from	endorsing	a	rule	of	limited	automaticity:	see	Zimmermann,	in	Tams/Sloan	(n	26,	at	61-
63)	for	a	detailed	assessment.	
78	As	noted	by	 the	 ILC	 in	 its	commentary	 to	 the	Draft	Articles	on	Succession	of	States	 in	Respect	of	
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According	 to	most	 commentators,	whatever	 the	 general	 rule,	 bilateral	 treaties	 are	
not	subject	to	a	rule	of	automatic	succession;79	according	to	the	ILA,	"the[ir]	fate	...	is	
generally	 decided	 through	negotiation	 between	 the	 successor	 State	 and	 the	 other	
party".80	
	
A	second	approach	seeks	differentiated	solutions	on	the	basis	of	a	fuller	appreciation	
of	 the	 parties’	 intentions.	 Of	 course,	 in	 an	 ideal	 case,	 those	 intentions	 will	 be	
expressed	in	formal	agreements	or	declarations	of	succession	(which,	as	mentioned	
above,	have	become	a	popular	means	of	clarifying	which	treaties	apply).	But	even	in	
the	absence	of	such	explicit	guidance,	practice	seems	to	have	accepted	some	degree	
of	 flexibility.	 Notably,	 domestic	 courts	 have	 on	 occasion	 continued	 to	 apply	 prior	
treaties	on	the	basis	of	presumed	(tacit)	consent,	where	“continuity	 [was]	 in	every	
State’s	interest”.81	Where	this	was	the	case	(as	e.g.	in	relation	to	extradition	or	FCN	
treaties),	 domestic	 courts	 have	 not	 infrequently	 relied	 on	 informal	 statements	 or	
conduct	 to	 establish	 consent; 82 	and	 "[s]ometimes	 simple	 intertia	 [has	 been]	
upgraded	as	continuity".83	Similarly,	in	the	Croatian	Genocide	case,	the	International	
Court	of	Justice	read	a	fairly	general	policy	statement	adopted	by	an	un-authorised	
assembly	 of	 parliamentarians	 as	 amounting	 to	 a	 valid	 declaration	 of	 succession.84	
Needless	 to	 say,	 such	attempts	 to	 infer	 consent	 from	statements	or	 conduct	 faces	
“inherent	 difficulties"; 85 	however,	 given	 the	 uncertainty	 of	 the	 applicable	 legal	
																																																																																																																																																														
Treaties:	ILC	Yearbook	1974,	vol.	II/1,	at	239.	
79	Stern	(n	17),	315-316;	Dumberry	(n	5),	78-82;	Shaw	(n	32),	67;	as	well	as	J	Klabbers,	M	Koskenniemi	
and	O	Ribbelink	 and	A	 Zimmermann	 (eds),	State	 Practice	 Regarding	 State	 Succession	 and	 Issues	 of	
Recognition	(1999),	116.		
80	ILA	2008	Resolution	(n	17),	para.	8.	
81	Koskenniemi	(n	27),	89.	According	to	O’Connell	(n	69,	at	736),	“[t]he	clearly	personal	treaties,	such	
as	commercial	or	extradition	treaties,	have	given	rise	to	no	problems".		
82	See	 e.g.	 R.	 Director	 of	 Public	 Prosecution,	 ex	 parte	 Schwartz	 (Jamaica),	 73	 ILR,	 45-48	 (1987)	
(continued	application	of	a	US-UK	extradition	treaty);	M	v.	Federal	Department	of	Justice	and	Police	
(Switzerland)	(continued	application	of	a	UK-Swiss	treaty	in	regard	to	South	Africa),	75	 ILR,	 	109-113	
(1987);	Re	Bottali	 (Italy)	 (continued	application	of	an	extradition	treaty	between	Italy	and	 India),	78	
ILR	111	(1988);	and	further	Gruber	(n	17),	206-216.		
83	Koskenniemi	(n	27),	89.	
84	Namely	 in	 the	Croatian-Serbian	Genocide	case,	 ICJ	Reports	2008,	412,	at	para.	108.	For	comment	
see	Zimmermann	in	Tams/Sloan	(n	26),	at	67-68.	
85	Genest	(n	15),	22.	
		 21	
standards,	 the	attraction	of	"pragmatic	arguments	 from	tacit	consent"86	is	obvious.	
And	overall,	 it	may	perhaps	be	said	that	the	more	flexible	approaches	just	outlined	
facilitate	 the	 search	 for	equitable	 solutions	 reflecting	 the	 intentions	of	 the	parties,	
and	at	least	offer	guidelines	for	the	application	of	a	fairly	unsettled	legal	framework.		
	
b)	Succession	to	BITs:	Widespread	Treaty	Practice,	and	the	Need	to	Look	Beyond	It		
As	noted	above,	there	has	so	far	been	no	comprehensive	effort	to	apply	the	general	
rules	on	State	succession	to	bilateral	investment	treaties.	Arbitral	practice	has	yet	to	
engage	fully	with	the	issues;	where	succession	questions	have	arisen,	tribunals	have	
generally	 preferred	 to	 tread	 softly.	 Commentators	 have	 only	 recently	 begun	 to	
explore	 arguments	 about	 succession	 to	 BITs;	 and	 while	 there	 is	 now	 a	 body	 of	
commentary,87	it	 remains	 focused	on	 the	grand	normative	debate	 -	 do	new	States	
automatically	succeed	to	prior	BITs?	This	question	no	doubt	is	relevant;	but	in	light	
of	the	preceding	considerations,	it	need	not	always	arise.	In	fact,	the	trends	towards	
process	and	flexibility	highlighted	above	mean	that	quite	often,	it	can	be	avoided.	To	
illustrate	 this	 point,	 and	 seeking	 to	present	 a	balanced	account	of	potential	 issues	
arising	 in	 investment	 treaty	 disputes,	 the	 subsequent	 sections	 provide	 an	
(admittedly	selective)	overview	of	recent	treaty	practice	regarding	succession	to	BITs	
(aa),	and	highlight	factors	that,	in	the	absence	of	express	agreement,	could	indicate	
that	 the	 parties	 implicitly	 agreed	 to	 the	 continued	 application	 of	 a	 prior	 BIT	 (bb).	
Following	 these	 considerations,	 section	 (cc)	 briefly	 revisits	 the	 debate	 about	
automatic	succession	to	BITs.	
	
aa)	Explicit	Party	Agreements		
The	 first	point	 is	based	on	a	 rather	 trite	proposition:	before	 rehearsing	arguments	
about	automatic	succession	to	treaties,	it	is	useful	to	analyse	whether	“the	fate	of	[a	
BIT	 has	 been]	 decided	 through	 negotiation	 between	 the	 successor	 State	 and	 the	
other	party..."88.	 This	 in	 fact	happens	 rather	 frequently:	 successor	 States	and	 their	
treaty	partners	 regularly	provide	explicit	 answers	 to	questions	of	 State	 succession.																																																									
86	Cf.	Koskenniemi	(n	27),	89.	
87	See	e.g.	Dumberry	(n	5),	id.	(n	15);	Genest	(n	15).		
88	Cf.	ILA	Resolution	(n	17),	para.	8.	
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The	full	extent	of	this	practice	is	difficult	to	assess,	if	only	because	information	is	not	
always	readily	available.89	Yet	an	illustrative	review	of	two	of	the	better-documented	
instances	of	State	succession	suggests	that	practice	is	significant.		
	
Serbia	and	Montenegro:	The	practice	of	Serbia	and	Montenegro	(which	was	widely	
considered	 a	 successor	 to	 the	 Socialist	 Federal	 Republic	 of	 Yugoslavia	 [‘SFRY’	 or	
‘former	Yugoslavia’],	and	which	eventually	gave	up	 its	claim	to	have	continued	 the	
former	 Yugoslavia’s	 legal	 personality90)	 provides	 a	 first	 example	 in	 point.	 By	 late	
1991,	the	SFRY	had	entered	into	seven	BITs.91	With	respect	to	three	of	these	seven	
prior	treaties,	Serbia	and	Montenegro	and	its	respective	treaty	partner	agreed	that	
the	 old	 treaty	 would	 continue	 to	 apply:	 this	 is	 true	 with	 respect	 to	 France,	 the	
Netherlands	 and	 Germany.92 	In	 two	 further	 instances,	 Serbia	 and	 Montenegro,	
during	 the	 2000s,	 entered	 into	 a	 new	 BIT	 with	 the	 treaty	 partners	 of	 the	 former	
SFRY:	this	applies	to	Egypt	and	Austria.93	(Serbia	and	Montenegro	also	concluded	a	
new	BIT	with	the	Netherlands,	with	which	it	had	initially	agreed	to	continue	the	old	
SFRY	 BIT.94)	 Importantly,	 according	 to	 their	 express	 terms,	 the	 new	 BITs	 entered																																																									
89	The	decision	in	favour	of	continuity	is	typically	embodied	in	a	bilateral	agreement,	which	in	turn	is	
often	part	 of	 a	wider	decision	about	 the	 future	of	 treaty	 relations	between	 the	parties.	 Yet	not	 all	
such	agreements	are	made	public;	comprehensive	findings	would	depend	on	a	detailed	examination	
of	diplomatic	practice.	Such	a	detailed	examination	is	beyond	the	scope	of	the	present	inquiry,	which	
draws	on	information	made	available	via	government	websites,	dedicated	investment	law	databases,	
and	published	collections	of	treaty	practice.	
90	See	supra,	section	2.b.	
91	Namely	with	Canada	(1973),	the	Netherlands	(1976)),	France	(1974),	Egypt	(1977),	Sweden	(1978),	
Germany	 (1989),	 Austria	 (1989).	 The	 five	 latter	 treaties	 are	 available	 at	
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org;	 the	 Canadian	 and	 Dutch	 treaties	 are	 at	 http://www.treaty-
accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=101508	 and	
(https://verdragenbank.overheid.nl/en/Verdrag/Details/011240	respectively.		
92 	See	 the	 bilateral	 agreeements	 recorded	 in	
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/traites/affichetraite.do?accord=TRA20030037	 (France),			
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/trb-2002-181.HTML	 (Netherlands),	 and	 Federal	 Gazette	
(Bundesgesetzblatt)	1997,	vol.	II,	961	(Germany).	
Following	its	independence	in	2006,	Montenegro	agreed	with	Germany	and	France	that	the	old	SFRY	
BIT	would	 continue	 to	 apply:	 see	Federal	Gazette	 (Bundesgesetzblatt)	 2011,	 vol.	 II,	 746	 (Germany);	
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/traites/affichetraite.do?accord=TRA00000468	 (France).	 Following	
Kosovo’s	 declaration	 of	 independence,	 the	 parties	 agreed	 that	 the	 old	 SFRY	 BITs	 would	 apply	 to	
Kosovo:	 see	 http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/traites/affichetraite.do?accord=TRA00000940	 (France)	
and	Federal	Gazette	(Bundesgesetzblatt)	2011,	vol.	II,	748	(Germany).	
93	See	Austria-Serbia/Montenegro	BIT	(2001);	Egypt-Serbia/Montenegro	BIT	(2005).		
94	See	Netherlands-Serbia/Montenegro	BIT	(2002).	
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between	 Serbia	 and	 Montenegro	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 Egypt,	 Austria	 and	 the	
Netherlands	 on	 the	 other,	 terminated	 (and	 thus	 replaced)	 the	 prior	 SFRY	
agreements.95	While	such	a	termination	provision	may	have	been	included	to	clarify	
the	situation,	 its	existence	suggests	that	the	new	treaty	parties	did	not	consider	to	
have	started	from	a	clean	slate.	
	
In	 short,	 of	 the	 seven	 BITs	 entered	 into	 by	 the	 SFRY,	 five	 were	 either	 expressly	
continued	or	replaced	by	new	BITs.	In	the	two	remaining	cases,	the	situation	is	more	
equivocal.	Based	on	readily	available	information	in	the	public	domain,	Sweden	and	
Serbia	and	Montenegro	seem	not	to	have	reached	an	explicit	agreement	to	continue	
the	 old	 SFRY-Sweden	 BIT	 (nor	 concluded	 a	 new	 BIT);	 yet	 the	 old	 BIT	 was	 clearly	
treated	as	applicable	in	proceedings	between	the	European	Commission	and	Sweden	
before	the	European	Court	of	Justice.96	Canada	did	enter	into	a	new	BIT	with	Serbia	
in	2014	 (i.e.	after	 the	separation	of	Montenegro),	but	 this	 treaty	 remains	silent	on	
the	 fate	 of	 the	 SFRY-Canada	BIT.97	As	 is	 clear	 from	 these	 latter	 two	 examples,	 the	
practice	of	treaty	parties	post	succession	does	not	address	all	the	 issues.	However,	
an	 analysis	 of	 Serbian-Montenegrin	 practice	 suggests	 that	 diplomatic	 exchanges	
between	the	States	concerned	significantly	reduce	the	areas	of	uncertainty.		
	
Czech	 Republic:	 The	 treatment	 of	 BITs	 entered	 into	 by	 Czech	 and	 Slovak	 Federal	
Republic	(‘CSFR’	or	‘former	Czechoslovakia’)	yields	even	clearer	findings.	At	the	time	
of	 its	dissolution,	16	BITs	were	 in	 force	 for	 the	CSFR.	During	 the	dissolution	of	 the	
CSFR,	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 (as	 well	 as	 the	 Slovak	 Republic)	 indicated	 that	 it	 would	
consider	 itself	 bound	 by	 multilateral	 and	 bilateral	 treaties	 entered	 into	 by	 the																																																									
95	See	 Austria-Serbia/Montenegro	 BIT	 (2001),	 Article	 12(4);	 Egypt-Serbia/Montenegro	 BIT	 (2005),	
Article	 13;	 Netherlands-Serbia/Montenegro	 BIT	 (2002),	 Article	 14(5).	 The	 ‘replacement	 clauses’	 of	
these	 treaties	 are	 not	 identical,	 but	 relatively	 similar.	 By	 way	 of	 illustration,	 Article	 12(4)	 of	 the	
Austria-Serbia/Montenegro	 BIT	 (2001)	 provides	 that	 "[t]he	 entry	 into	 force	 of	 this	 Agreement	
between	 the	 Government	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Austria	 and	 the	 Federal	 Government	 of	 the	 Federal	
Republic	 of	 Yugoslavia	 shall	 terminate	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 Agreement	 on	 the	 Promotion	 and	
Protection	of	 Investments	between	 the	Republic	of	Austria	and	 the	Socialist	 Federative	Republic	of	
Yugoslavia,	signed	in	Belgrade	on	25	October	1989.”	
96	See	European	Court	of	 Justice,	Commission	of	 the	European	Communities	 v.	 Kingdom	of	 Sweden,	
Case	C-249/06.	
97	See	http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3152,		
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CSFR.98	Following	independence,	the	Czech	Republic	and	its	treaty	partners	clarified	
the	future	application	of	bilateral	treaties	concluded	with	the	CSFR.	In	14	of	the	16	
cases,	the	Czech	Republic	and	its	respective	treaty	partner	explicitly	agreed	that	the	
prior	CSFR	BIT	would	continue	to	apply,	 typically	by	 including	the	prior	 treaty	on	a	
list	 of	 treaties	 that	 would	 “remain	 in	 force”:	 agreements	 along	 the	 lines	 were	
reached	 with	 the	 Netherlands,99	Austria,100 	Switzerland,101	Germany,102	France,103	
the	 United	 Kingdom,104	the	 United	 States,105as	 well	 as	 Denmark,	 Finland,	 Spain,	
Sweden,	Greece,	Norway,	the	United	States	and	the	Belgium-Luxembourg	Economic	
Union.106	In	 the	 two	 remaining	 instances	 (the	 CSFR-China	 and	 CSFR-Canada	 BITs),	
new	BITs	were	 concluded.	 Both	 of	 these	 new	BITs	 expressly	 terminated	 (and	 thus	
replaced)	 the	 treaties	 agreed	with	 the	CSFR107	-	 again	 suggesting	 that	 the	 old	 BITs	
had	not	 simply	 ceased	 to	apply.	 In	 fact,	 the	Czech-Canadian	BIT	accepted	 that	 the	
prior	 CSFR-Canada	 	 would	 “continue	 to	 apply	 to	 any	 dispute	 between	 either	
Contracting	 Party	 and	 an	 investor	 of	 the	 other	 Contracting	 Party	 that	 has	 been	
																																																								
98 	See	 e.g.	 ‘Proclamation	 to	 all	 Parliaments	 and	 Nations	 of	 the	 World’	 of	 17	 December	 1992,	
reproduced	in	Klabbers	et.	al.	(n	79),	at	402;	see	also	Article	5(2)	of	Constitutional	Act	No.	4/1993	(at	
http://www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/ustavni_soud_www/Pravni_uprava/AJ/4_1993_EN.pdf)
.	It	is	worth	noting	the	former	Czechoslovakia	had	been	a	party	to	the	1978	Vienna	Convention.	
99	See	 Tractatenblad	 1995,	 Nr.	 27,	 at	 3,	 5:	 see	 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/trb-1995-
27.HTML	
100 	See	
http://www.bmwfw.gv.at/Aussenwirtschaft/investitionspolitik/Documents/Bilaterale%20Investitions
schutzabkommen/Tschechien2.pdf.		
101	See	www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19900247/index.html#fn1.	
102	Federal	Gazette	(Bundesgesetzblatt)	1993,	vol.	II,	762.	
103	See	http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/traites/affichetraite.do?accord=TRA19950270.	
104	See	UK	Treaty	Series	1996,	Third	Supplementary	List,	96.		
105	According	 to	 Williams,	 on	 24	 April	 1993,	 the	 Czech	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 notified	 the	 US	
Department	 of	 State	 of	 a	 number	 of	 prior	 bilateral	 agreements	 (incl.	 the	 CSFR-US	 BIT)	 that	 it	
considered	 to	 remain	 in	 force:	 PR	Williams,	 The	 Treaty	 Obligations	 of	 the	 Successor	 States	 of	 the	
Former	Soviet	Union,	Yugoslavia,	and	Czechoslovakia:	Do	They	Continue	in	Force?,	Denver	Journal	of	
International	Law	and	Policy	23	(1994-1995),	1,	at	40-41.	According	to	information	provided	by	the	US	
Trade	Representative	“[a]fter	the	breakup	of	Czechoslovakia	in	1993,	[the	CSFR-US	BIT]	continued	in	
effect	 for	 the	 successor	 states,	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 and	 	Slovakia”	 (at	
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_002809.asp).	 See	 also	
Dumberry	(n	5),	85	(his	fn.	72).		
106	See	the	references	in	Klabbers	et.	al.	(n	79),	at	442,	444,	454,	458,	460.	
107	Czech-Chinese	BIT,	Article	13(4);	Czech-Canadian	BIT,	Article	XV(7).	
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submitted	 to	 arbitration	 pursuant	 to	 that	 Agreement	 by	 the	 investor	 prior	 to	 the	
date	that	this	Agreement	enters	into	force.”108	
	
The	brief	summary	suggests	that,	when	addressing	the	fate	of	prior	BITs,	the	Czech	
Republic	 and	 its	 treaty	 partners	 opted	 for	 a	 near-absolute	 continuity.	 Against	 that	
background,	 it	 should	 perhaps	 not	 come	 as	 a	 huge	 surprise	 that	 arbitral	 tribunals	
addressing	the	rather	many	BIT-based	claims	against	the	Czech	Republic	have	seen	
little	reason	to	provide	detailed	reasoning.	As	Dumberry	notes,	most	of	the	relevant	
awards	"barely	mentioned	…	the	relevant	succession	issues";109	indeed	often110	they	
no	more	than	record,	in	a	single	phrase,	that	"the	Czech	Republic	succeeded	to	the	
rights	and	obligations	of	the	Czech	and	Slovak	Federal	Republic	under	the	Treaty".111	
And	 while	 brief	 statements	 like	 this	 one	 may	 indeed	 not	 do	 full	 justice	 to	 the	
intricacies	of	 the	 law	of	State	 succession,	 the	 tribunals’	 telegraphic	 “reasoning”	no	
doubt	gives	effect	to	the	intention	of	the	treaty	parties.	 In	the	various	proceedings	
against	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 it	 simply	 (as	 noted	 by	 another	 tribunal)	 was	 "not	 in	
dispute	that	the	Respondent	succeeded	to	the	rights	and	obligations	under	the	ΒΙΤ	
as	originally	entered	into	by	the	Czech	and	Slovak	Federal	Republic”.112	
	
***	
	
																																																								
108	Czech-Canadian	 BIT,	 Article	 XV(7).	 The	 provision	 also	 refers	 to	 “the	 Agreement	 between	 the	
Government	 of	 Canada	 and	 the	 Government	 of	 the	 Czech	 and	 Slovak	 Federal	 Republic	 for	 the	
Promotion	and	Protection	of	Investments,	done	at	Prague	on	15	November	1990,	insofar	as	it	is	now	
an	Agreement	between	Canada	and	the	Czech	Republic”	(emphasis	added).	
109	Dumberry	(n	5),	96.	See	ibid.,	84-89,	for	a	fuller	review	of	arbitral	jurisprudence	in	cases	involving	
the	Czech	and	Slovak	Republics.		
110	Similarly	brief	is	the	'discussion’	in	the	following	awards:	Binder	v.	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	Final	
Award,	 15	 June	 2007,	 para.	 385;	 European	 Media	 Ventures	 SA	 v.	 The	 Czech	 Republic,	 UNCITRAL,	
Partial	Award	on	Liability,	8	July	2009,	para.	1;	Invesmart	v.	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	Award,	26	June	
2009,	para.	8;	Eastern	Sugar	BV	(Netherlands)	v	The	Czech	Republic	 (SCC	Case	No	088/2004),	Partial	
Award,	27	March		2007,	para.	5.		
111	See	CME	 Czech	 Republic	 BV	 v	 Czech	 Republic,	 UNCITRAL,	 Partial	 Award,	 13	 September	 2001,	 at	
para.	3.	
112 	ECE	 Projektmanagement	 &	 Kommanditgesellschaft	 PANTA	 Achtundsechzigste	
Grundstücksgesellschaft	mbH	&	Co.	v.	The	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	PCA	Case	No.	2010-5,	Award,	19	
September	2013,	para.	3.139.	
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This	 summary	 review	 of	 Czech	 and	 Serbian-Montenegrin	 practice	 illustrates	 the	
importance	of	explicit	party	agreements	determining	the	fate	of	prior	treaties.	Such	
agreements	 may	 be	 difficult	 to	 trace	 and	 often	 are	 reached	 some	 time	 after	 the	
succession,	leaving	the	law	uncertain	during	the	interim	(‘twilight’)	period.	However,	
the	two	case	studies	suggest	that	explicit	agreements	are	numerous	and,	in	a	large	
number	of	 instances,	clarify	whether	a	new	State	 is	bound	by	treaties	entered	into	
by	 its	 predecessor.	 As	 to	 the	 outcome	 of	 such	 agreements,	 Czech	 and	 Serbian-
Montenegrin	practice	 is	 also	 indicative:	when	discussing	 the	 fate	of	 a	 prior	 treaty,	
the	 Czech	 Republic,	 Serbia	 and	 Montenegro	 and	 their	 respective	 treaty	 partners	
have	almost	inevitably	opted	for	some	form	of	continuity	–	typically	by	agreeing	that	
an	old	BIT	should	continue	to	apply,	alternatively	by	replacing	it	with	a	new	one.	This	
practice	 reflects	 the	 considerable	 appeal	 of	 stability	 in	 investment	 treaty	 relations	
and	 it	 bears	 out	 Cheng’s	 more	 general	 observation	 that	 “[i]n	 most	 instances	 of	
succession,	accepting	the	overall	continuity	of	commercial	arrangements	is	the	only	
realistic	option."113	
	
bb)	Inferring	Consent		
While	 treaty	 parties	 are	 numerous,	 they	 do	not	 cover	 all	 BITs,	 and	of	 course	 they	
may	take	time	to	be	reached.	Even	States	that	are	keen	to	clarify	the	state	of	their	
treaty	rights	and	obligations	post	independence	may	need	time	to	reach	agreement	
with	their	treaty	partners.	 In	other	 instances,	new	States,	for	a	number	of	reasons,	
may	 struggle	 to	 identify	 the	 manifold	 bilateral	 treaties	 raising	 issues	 of	 State	
succession.	 	To	 illustrate,	 the	 position	 of	 South	 Sudan	 vis-à-vis	 prior	 BITs	 remains	
largely	 uncertain.	 At	 the	 time	 of	 writing	 and	 based	 on	 the	 publicly	 available	
information,	of	the	(at	least114)	13	BITs	entered	into	by	Sudan,	only	one	has	been	the	
subject	of	an	explicit	agreement,	and	even	in	respect	of	that	one	treaty,	information	
is	 incomplete.115	As	 regards	 the	 fate	 of	 the	 twelve	 other	 treaties	 that	 applied																																																									
113	Cheng	(n	15),	404.	
114	See	supra,	information	in	fn.	63.		
115	The	German	government	website	states	that	the	Germany-Sudan	BIT	applies	 in	relation	to	South	
Sudan:	 see	
http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Aussenwirtschaft/Investitionsschutz/investitionsschutzvertraege.h
tml.	It	does	not	refer	to	a	formal	agreement	to	this	effect,	though.		
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between	 Sudan	 and	 its	 respective	 treaty	 partners,	 publicly	 available	 information	
provides	no	clear	guidance.		
	
The	 question	 is	 how	 to	 deal	 with	 this	 uncertainty.	 According	 to	 one	 approach,	
"diplomatic	clarifications	or	express	statements	…	represent	the	only	way	to	lift	the	
cloud	of	uncertainty”116	–	which	seems	to	suggest	that	all	other	instances	would	be	
covered	 by	 the	 general	 rule	 governing	 succession	 to	 bilateral	 treaties.	 Such	 an	
approach	 is	 straightforward,	 but	 too	 categorical;	 it	 ignores	 the	 trend	 towards	
flexibility	 that	 characterises	 the	 general	 regime	 of	 State	 succession.117	As	 noted	
above,	the	crucial	question	is	whether	the	new	State	and	the	other	party	to	the	prior	
treaty	 intended	 to	 apply	 the	 treaty	 post	 independence.	 Especially	 in	 the	 bilateral	
context,	where	the	parties’	 intention	to	be	bound	by	a	treaty	does	not	need	to	be	
expressed	in	a	formal	manner,118	there	is	certainly	room	for	a	broader	analysis	that	
looks	beyond	explicit	party	agreements.119	Whilst	definitive	findings	will	depend	on	
an	overall	assessment	of	the	available	evidence,	the	following	elements	could	guide	
the	analysis:		
	
-	Unilateral	statements	by	the	successor	State:	In	the	absence	of	an	explicit	bilateral	
agreement	between	the	treaty	parties,	successor	States	may	have	unilaterally	taken	
a	 view	 on	 the	 application	 of	 prior	 bilateral	 treaties.	 Such	 unilateral	 statements	
cannot	bind	putative	treaty	partners,120	but	they	may	help	 identify	the	view	of	one	
party.	Where	the	view	of	that	party	 is	not	opposed,	 it	can	provide	the	basis	 for	an																																																									
116 	Discussing	 putative	 obligations	 of	 South	 Sudan	 post	 independence,	 Genest	 e.g.	 notes	 that	
"diplomatic	 clarifications	 or	 express	 statements	 …	 represent	 the	 only	 way	 to	 lift	 the	 cloud	 of	
uncertainty	hovering	over	the	Sudan	BITs	in	respect	of	South	Sudan"	(n	15,	at	22).		
117	See	supra,	section	4.a.	
118	Contrast	 e.g.	 the	 more	 formalised	 process	 governing	 expressions	 to	 be	 bound	 by	 multilateral	
treaties;	 these	often	prescribe	 specific	modes	of	 becoming	bound	 (accession,	 ratification,	 etc.)	 and	
typically	designate	a	depositary	to	ensure	questions	of	consent,	party	status,	are	handled	impartially.		
119	See	 Aust	 (n	 69),	 369:	 "In	 the	 case	 of	 a	bilateral	 treaty,	much	 depends	 on	what	 can	 be	 agreed,	
expressly	 or	 tacitly,	 between	 the	 successor	 state	 and	 the	 third	 state“	 (italics	 in	 the	 original).	More	
generally,	 see	 also	 J	 Brunnée,	 Consent,	 in	 Max	 Planck	 Encyclopedia	 of	 Public	 International	 Law	
(www.mpepil.com),	at	para.	20:	"Individual	States’	explicit	consent	remains	central,	in	both	the	initial	
adoption	and	subsequent	development	of	treaties.	In	the	latter	context,	attenuated	forms	of	consent,	
such	as	consent	that	is	presumed	subject	to	opt-out,	are	increasingly	common."	
120	See	Article	9	of	the	1978	Vienna	Convention,	which	clarifies	that,	 in	and	of	themselves,	unilateral	
statements	cannot	create	rights	and	obligations	for	third	States.		
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argument	based	on	tacit	party	consent.	By	way	of	illustration,	it	is	indicative	that	in	a	
number	 of	 disputes	 against	 the	 Czech	 and	 Slovak	 Republic,	 investment	 tribunals	
relied	 on	 unilateral	 statements	 as	 evidence	 of	 the	 new	 States’	 willingness	 to	
continue	 prior	 treaty	 obligations.121	In	 the	 recent	 UNCITRAL	 award	 in	World	Wide	
Minerals	 v.	 Kazakhstan	 (which,	 as	 noted	 above,	 has	 not	 been	 released	 so	 far),	 the	
Claimants	 are	 equally	 said	 to	 have	 “adduced	 a	 series	 of	 specific	 statements	 and	
representations	by	Kazakhstan	that	were	alleged	to	signal	that	country’s	intent	to	be	
bound	by	this	particular	U.S.S.R.	BIT”.122	
	
-	Unilateral	statements	by	the	putative	treaty	partner:	Conversely,	statements	by	the	
putative	treaty	partner	may	provide	guidance.	By	way	of	illustration,	treaty	partners	
of	 the	 predecessor	 State	 may	 have	 formulated	 expectations	 about	 the	 successor	
State’s	 approach	 to	 prior	 treaties,	 e.g.	 before	 extending	 recognition.123	While	 such	
expectations	may	not	easily	be	enforceable	post	 recognition,	 they	can	provide	 the	
basis	of	a	tacit	agreement	if	the	successor	State	accepts	them.	
		
-	Statements	contained	in	devolution	or	related	agreements:	Devolution	agreements	
between	the	States	involved	in	a	negotiated	process	of	separation	or	dissolution,	just	
as	 further	 arrangements,	 provide	 another	 "rich	 source	 of	 data	 on	 the	 law	 on	
succession".124	Like	unilateral	statements	by	the	successor	State,	they	do	not	as	such	
																																																								
121	See	e.g.	Saluka	Investments	BV	v	Czech	Republic	(UNCITRAL),	Jurisdiction	over	the		Counterclaim,	7	
May	 2004:	 "The	 Czech	 Republic	 confirmed	 to	 the	 Kingdom	 of	 The	 Netherlands	 that,	 upon	 the	
separation	of	the	Czech	and	Slovak	Federal	Republic	into	two	separate	republics,	the	Treaty	remained	
in	 force	 between	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 and	 the	 Kingdom	of	 The	Netherlands"	 (at	 para.	 2).	 	 	 The	 key	
question	 is	whether	 the	 other	 party	 can	 be	 taken	 to	 have	 consented:	 this	 depends	 on	 the	 regular	
operation	 of	 principles	 governing	 consent	 inferred	 from	 silence	 or	 passivity;	 the	 specificity	 and	
authority	of	the	unilateral	statement	are	relevant	in	this	respect.	
122	Investment	Arbitration	Reporter,	In	Dramatic	Holding...	(n	12).			
123	For	 example,	Williams	 refers	 to	 letters	 sent	 by	US	President	Bush	 to	 the	Prime	Ministers	 of	 the	
Czech	 and	 Slovak	 Republics	 on	 1	 December,	 proposing	 "that	 the	 United	 States	 and	 the	 respective	
states	'conduct	full	diplomatic	relations'	based	on	the	affirmation	of	the	Republics	to	fulfill	a	number	
of	commitments,	 including	the	'commitment	to	fulfill	the	treaty	and	other	obligations	of	the	former	
Czechoslovakia’“.	 While	 Williams	 criticises	 "the	 deficiency	of	 the	 U.S.	approach	 to	 securing	
continuation	of	bilateral	bilateral	treaties",	arbitral	practice	has	accepted	the	continued	application	of	
the	prior	treaties.	See	PR	Williams	(n	105),	at	30	and	32;	and	cf.	supra,	section	4.b.aa.	for	a	summary	
of	arbitral	practice.		
124	Cheng	(n	15),	262.	
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bind	 third	 parties;125	but	 they	 can	 help	 identify	 a	 new	 State’s	 approach	 to	 prior	
treaty	obligations.	In	1991,	the	members	of	the	newly-established	Commonwelath	of	
Independent	 States	 (‘CIS’)	 e.g.,	 in	 a	 general	 manner,	 affirmed	 their	 desire	 to	
"discharge	 the	 international	 obligations	 incumbent	 on	 them	 under	 treaties	 and	
agreements	 entered	 into	 by	 the	 former	 Union	 of	 Soviet	 Socialist	 Republics”.126	As	
regards	 South	 Sudan,	 a	 bilateral	 cooperation	 agreement	 of	 2012	 recorded	 the	
intention	 of	 Sudan	 and	 South	 Sudan	 to	 abide	 by	 obligations	 arising	 out	 of	 their	
membership	 in	 global	 and	 regional	 trade	 organisations	 and	 "other	 similar	
institutions".127	As	 the	 other	 types	 of	 evidence	 mentioned,	 none	 of	 this	 need	 be	
conclusive:	broad	statements	such	as	those	made	by	the	CIS	member	States	may	too	
general	to	provide	evidence	of	a	willingness	to	continue	specific	treaties;128	while	the	
more	 specific	 Sudan-South	 Sudan	 Agreement	 may	 not	 cover	 obligations	 under	
BITs.129	However,	there	is	little	reason	to	ignore	the	agreements	altogether.			
	
-	Conduct	during	proceedings:	In	addition	to	earlier	statements,	the	successor	State’s	
conduct	during	arbitral	proceedings	may	be	relevant.	While	the	applicability	of	a	BIT	
is	a	matter	for	objective	determination	by	the	tribunal,	the	respondent	State’s	views	
in	the	proceedings	may	be	indicative.130	In	some	of	the	proceedings	brought	against	
the	 Czech	 and	 Slovak	 Republics,	 arbitral	 tribunals	 e.g.	 seemed	 willing	 to	 treat	
questions	 of	 succession	 en	 passant	 because	 the	 Claimant	 and	 Respondent	 were	
																																																								
125	See	Article	8	of	the	1978	Vienna	Convention.		
126	Minsk	 Agreement	 (establishing	 the	 Commonweath	 of	 Independent	 States),	 International	 Legal	
Materials	31	(1992),	147,	at	Article	12;	and	further	the	Declaration	of	Almaty,	ibid.,	at	148.	
127 	Agreement	 on	 Trade	 and	 Trade-Related	 Issues,	 Article	 2	 (at	
http://sudanwatch.blogspot.de/2013/03/full-text-nine-agreements-between-sudan.html).		
128	But	 see	 the	 reference,	 in	 fn.	84,	 to	 the	 ICJ’s	 judgment	 in	 the	Croatian-Serbian	Genocide	 case,	 in	
which	a	general	declaration	was	treated	as	a	valid	declaration	of	succession.	
129	See	 Genest	 (n	 15),	 at	 5:	 "Articles	 2(1)	 and	 2(2)	 [of	 the	 Agreement	 on	 Trade	 and	 Trade-Related	
Issues]	 raise	 two	unanswered	questions	with	 likely	negative	answers:	 first,	whether	 the	Sudan	BITs	
constitute	 a	body	of	 rules	 arising	out	of	 the	membership	 to	 an	 institution	 similar	 to	 the	WTO,	 and	
second	whether	they	constitute	‘other	relevant	trade	principles’."	
130	Support	for	the	general	proposition	(that	conduct	during	the	proceedings	 is	relevant)	can	e.g.	be	
found	 in	the	case	of	US	v.	Bowe,	 in	which	the	Privy	Council	 found	that	"the	two	Governments	have	
shown	by	their	conduct,	 including	their	conduct	 in	the	present	proceedings,	that	they	both	intended	
their	extradition	arrangements	to	remain	in	force"	(International	Law	Reports,	vol.	85,	144;	emphasis	
added).		
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agreed	on	the	matter.131		
	
The	 list	 is	 illustrative	 rather	 than	 exhaustive:	 clearly,	 in	 seeking	 to	 establish	 the	
intention	of	the	parties,	tribunals	or	other	decision-makers	are	not	bound	to	a	strict	
canon	of	admissible	 sources.	 It	 also	bears	 re-iterating	 that,	whatever	evidence	has	
been	 brought	 forward,	 will	 need	 to	 be	 evaluated	 in	 the	 light	 of	 all	 factual	
circumstances.	However,	with	 these	 caveats,	 the	preceding	 considerations	 suggest	
that,	 such	 intention	 can	 be	 deduced	 from	 other	 statements,	 or	 inferred	 from	
conduct.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 explicit	 party	 agreement	 on	 (dis-
)continuity	does	not	conclude	matters;	it	means	that	the	matter	needs	to	be	studied	
more	fully.	
	
cc)	Automatic	Succession	to	BITs?	
In	 the	 light	 of	 the	 preceding	 considerations,	 the	 question	 of	 automatic	 succession	
may	perhaps	not	arise	frequently;	 in	many	disputes,	the	treaty	parties,	explicitly	or	
implicitly,	 have	 expressed	 a	 view.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 remains	 relevant,	 both	
conceptually	 and	 in	 relation	 to	 cases	 in	 which	 the	 parties’	 intention	 cannot	 be	
established.		
	
On	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 general	 regime	 of	 State	 succession	 (controversial	 as	 it	 is),	 the	
argument	 for	 automatic	 succession	 to	 bilateral	 treaties	 meets	 with	 considerable	
obstacles.	 Of	 course,	 new	 States	 would	 automatically	 be	 bound	 by	 prior	 BITs	 if	
Article	34	of	the	1978	Vienna	Convention	applied	(which	it	hardly	ever	does).	Yet,	as	
noted	 above, 132 	the	 better	 view	 is	 that	 Article	 34	 does	 not	 reflect	 customary	
international	law	–	and	that	it	certainly	does	not	reflect	customary	international	law	
as	far	as	bilateral	treaties	are	concerned:	as	long	as	these	are	seen	as	one	category,	
and	viewed	as	inter-party	bargains	of	an	“essentially	voluntary”	character,	the	case	
																																																								
131	See	 e.g.	HICEE	 BV	 v	 Slovak	 Republic,	 UNCITRAL	 (PCA	 Case	 No	 2009-11),	 Partial	 Award,	 23	May	
2011,	at	para.	3	fn.	2:	"It	is	not	in	dispute	that,	after	the	dissolution	of	the	Czech	and	Slovak	Federal	
Republic	on	31	December	1992,	the	Slovak	Republic	succeeded	to	the	[CSFR-Netherlands	BIT]."	
132	See	supra,	section	4.a.	
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for	automatic	succession	is	weak.133	The	fact	that,	when	determining	the	fate	of	BITs	
through	 explicit	 agreements,	 new	 States	 and	 their	 treaty	 partners	 have	 almost	
inevitably	opted	 for	 treaty	 stability,	does	not	necessarily	affect	 this	understanding.	
As	 in	other	areas	of	 international	 law,	 the	 impact	of	explicit	 treaty	agreements	on	
the	underlying	customary	norm	is	ambivalent:	while	explicit	agreements	reflect	the	
appeal	 of	 continuity	 (and	 thus	 the	 ratio	 of	 Article	 34),	 the	 fondness	 of	 States	 for	
negotiated	 outcomes	 can	 equally	 be	 said	 to	 undermine	 the	 case	 for	 automatic	
succession.134	On	 the	basis	of	 these	arguments,	 recent	 studies	 reject	 the	view	 that	
new	States	were	automatically	bound	by	prior	BITs;	unless	the	parties	have	agreed	
otherwise,	the	new	State	position	starts	with	a	clean	‘BIT	slate’.135	
There	 is	 force	 to	 such	 an	 approach,	 but	 perhaps	 it	 does	 not	 do	 full	 justice	 to	
arguments	 in	 favour	 of	 automatic	 succession	 to	 BITs.	 If	 that	 case	were	made,136	it	
would	need	to	be	based	on	analysis	 that	 looks	beyond	the	number	of	parties,	and	
that	 takes	 issue	 with	 the	 characterisation	 of	 BITs	 as	 “essentially	 voluntary”	 inter-
State	arrangements.137	An	argument	for	automaticity	could	instead	emphasise	that,	
																																																								
133	See	ILC	Yearbook	1974,	vol.	II/1,	at	239;	and	cf.	supra,	section	4.a.	
134	See	Dumberry	(n	5),	82:	"the	very	fact	that	such	negotiation	took	place	in	most	cases	suggests	that	
third	States	have	generally	not	accepted	the	principle	of	automatic	succession."	
135	See	Genest	(n	15),	9	(arguing	that	"clean	slate	and	mutual	consent	should	prevail	for	all	seceding	
states	in	respect	of	bilateral	treaties");	Dumberry	(n	15),	27	("the	tabula	rasa	principle	should	apply	to	
all	new	states");	Dumberry	(n	5),	81	("there	is	no	automatic	continuity	of	bilateral	treaties	because	of	
the	particular	nature	of	these	treaties.
	
Any	treaty	continuation	is	ultimately	the	result	of	the	express	
(or	tacit)	agreement	of	both	States"	[footnotes	omitted]).	
136	So	far,	to	the	author’s	knowledge,	the	case	for	automaticity	has	not	so	far	been	set	out	in	detail.	
For	 a	 clear	 exposition	 of	 its	 likely	 starting	 point	 –	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 separate	 State	 succession	
question	–	see	the	the	affidavit	of	Sir	Daniel	Bethlehem	submitted	in	the	Sanum	proceedings	before	
the	 Singapore	High	Court:	 At	 para.	 42,	 Sir	Daniel	 notes:	 "While	 it	 is	 a	 treaty	 between	 the	 PRC	 and	
Laos,	binding	on	the	two	States	as	parties,	[the	China-Laos	BIT]	also	establishes	a	legal	framework	that	
is	 expressly	 intended	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 private	 persons	 who	 qualify	 as	 ‘investors’,	 both	 natural	
persons	and	economic	entities	 (PRC/Laos	BIT,	Article	1(2)).	More	specifically,	Articles	2–6	of	the	BIT	
create	 rights	 for	 qualified	 investors	 that	 are	 actionable	 in	 their	 own	 name	 under	 the	 dispute	
settlement	provisions	of	Article	8	of	the	BIT.	So,	although	the	BIT	is	an	instrument	concluded	by	the	
PRC	and	Laos,	and	binding	upon	them,	it	also	creates	actionable	rights	for	natural	and	legal	persons	
having	 the	 nationality,	 or	 which	 are	 established	 under	 the	 laws,	 of	 the	 Contracting	 States.	 As	 the	
Article	 12(4)	 legal	 framework	 stability	 clause	 makes	 clear,	 such	 persons	 have	 acquired	 rights	 and	
legitimate	expectations	in	the	arrangements	established	by	the	BIT":	see	Sanum	Investments	Limited	
v.	 Lao	 People’s	 Democratic	 Republic,	 Affidavit	 of	 Sir	 Daniel	 Bethlehem	 KCMG	 QC,	 at	
http://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/3696.	For	more	on	the	Sanum	case	see	below,	section	5.	
137	In	the	Sanum	case,	the	arbitral	recognised	that	not	all	bilateral	treaties	could	be	treated	alike:	“the	
Tribunal	 considers	 that	 it	 would	 be	 excessive	 to	 say	 that	 all	 bilateral	 treaties	 are	 so	 personal,	 so	
related	 to	 intuitu	personae	questions	 that	 they	cannot	 survive	a	State’s	 succession.	 In	other	words,	
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while	concluded	between	States,	BITs	establish	substantive	rights	of	investors,	which	
are	 directly	 enforceable	 in	 arbitral	 proceedings.	 While	 formally	 bilateral,	 it	 does	
indeed	seem	overly	restrictive	to	view	BITs	merely	as	inter-State	bargains.	Yet	once	
the	 focus	 is	 broadened	 to	 include	 the	 interests	 of	 foreign	 investors,	 two	 related	
arguments	in	favour	of	automaticity	could	be	advanced.	First,	treaty-based	investor	
rights	could	be	likened	to	‘vested’	or	‘acquired’	rights,	which	occupied	a	prominent	
place	 in	 traditional	 debates	 about	 State	 succession	 –	 and	 which	 were	 claimed	 by	
many	to	survive	instances	of	State	succession.138	Applied	to	the	present	context,	one	
could	perhaps	argue	that	foreign	investors	making	an	investment	when	a	BIT	applies	
should	acquire	the	right	to	have	that	investment	protected	by	the	BIT	after	the	State	
succession	has	taken	place.139	
	
Second,	pressing	the	point	in	light	of	recent	arguments	about	automatic	succession	
to	 particular	 categories	 of	 treaties,	 there	 might	 be	 room	 for	 a	 ‘human	 rights	
analogy’:	 adapting	 a	 prominent	 dictum	 by	 the	 UN	 Human	 Rights	 Committee,	 one	
could	 indeed	argue	that,	as	rights	under	BITs	"belong	[to	foreign	 investors]...,	once	
[foreign	investors]	are	accorded	the	protection	of	the	rights	under	the	[treaty],	such	
protection	devolves	with	territory	and	continues	to	belong	to	them,	notwithstanding	
...	State	succession".140	
	
																																																																																																																																																														
the	Tribunal	considers	that	it	 is	necessary	to	consider	the	application	of	the	general	rule	to	bilateral	
treaties	on	a	case-by-case	basis"	(n	9,	at	para.	281).	
138	See	 notably	 O’Connell	 (n	 17),	 vol.	 1,	 304	 et	 seq.	 	 For	 details	 see	 Ko	 Swan	 Sik,	 The	 Concept	 of	
Acquired	Rights	 in	 International	 Law:	 a	 Survey,	 in	H	Meijers	 and	B	Vierdag,	 Essays	on	 International	
Law	and	Relations	 in	Honour	of	A.J.P.	Tammes	(1977),	120;	and	MI	Torres	Cazorla,	Rights	of	Private	
Persons	on	State	Succession:	an	Approach	to	the	Most	Recent	Cases,	in	Eisemann/Koskenniemi	(n	27),	
663.	
139	See	e.g.	Vagts	 (n	69),	281:	 "States	 in	 their	 relations	with	each	other	are	entitled	 to	 rely	on	each	
other's	commitments.	…	In	other	cases,	the	individual	citizens	do	the	relying	–	they	make	investments	
in	the	territory	of	the	other	state	because	of	the	assurance	(often	contained	in	a	treaty	of	friendship,	
commerce	 and	 navigation	 or	 bilateral	 investment	 treaty)	 that	 they	 have	 a	 right	 to	 establish	
themselves	and	that	their	investment	will	not	be	taken	from	them	except	upon	prompt,	adequate	and	
effective	 compensation."	 It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that,	 in	 order	 for	 such	 an	 argument	 to	 open	 the	 way	
towards	treaty-based	arbitration,	one	would	need	to	argue	that	rights	acquired	under	an	applicable	
BIT	are	opposable	to	the	successor	State	as	a	matter	of	treaty	law.		
140	Human	Rights	Committee,	General	Comment	No.	26	(61),	UN	Doc.	CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1	
(1997),	at	para.	4.	
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These	points	are	purposively	put	tentatively,	as	the	debate	is	at	an	early	stage	–	and	
as	 quite	 often,	 the	 parties	 have	 determined	 the	 fate	 of	 their	 BITs	 explicitly	 or	
implicitly.	It	must	be	recognised	that	the	case	argument	for	automatic	succession	to	
BITs	 is	 anything	 but	 straightforward.	 It	 depends	 on	 a	 particularly	 investor-friendly	
reading	 of	 those	 treaties,	 which	 –	 given	 recent	 backlashes	 against	 investment	
arbitration	–	may	have	lost	some	of	its	appeal.	However,	the	brief	sketch	of	potential	
arguments	suggests	that	the	matter	is	at	least	open	to	argument.	
	
***	
	
Of	 the	 various	 succession	 issues	 addressed	 in	 the	 present	 inquiry,	 the	 question	 of	
succession	to	prior	BITs	is	the	most	relevant.	As	the	preceding	discussion	suggests,	it	
eschews	 a	 clear-cut	 answer.	 The	 general	 regime	 governing	 succession	 to	 treaties	
offers	 relatively	 limited	 guidance;	 as	 a	 consequence,	 States	 are	 well	 advised	 to	
determine	the	fate	of	BITs	through	explicit	agreements.	Where	such	agreements	are	
concluded,	they	clearly	bear	out	the	immense	appeal	of	treaty	continuity.		
		
Absent	explicit	agreements,	tribunals	and	other	decision-makers	are	likely,	in	future	
disputes,	to	establish	the	parties’	 intentions	from	‘circumstantial	evidence’,	such	as	
unilateral	statements	or	conduct.	This	approach	now	doubt	is	fraught	with	“inherent	
difficulties",141	but,	 if	 undertaken	 properly,	 can	 facilitate	 the	 search	 for	 equitable	
solutions.	 Finally,	 future	 disputes	 may	 witness	 a	 return	 to	 the	 ‘big	 debate’	 about	
automatic	 succession	 to	 treaties,	 which	 so	 far	 has	 hardly	 begun:	 as	 noted	 in	 the	
preceding	 paragraphs,	with	 respect	 to	 BITs	 creating	 investor	 rights,	 that	 debate	 is	
perhaps	more	open	than	the	literature	on	succession	to	bilateral	treaties	suggests.		
	
	
5.	Cession,	Incorporation	and	Their	Impact	on	Investment	Treaties		
Questions	of	 treaty	 succession	are	not	 restricted	 to	 the	emergence	of	new	States.	
The	broad	definition	set	out	in	Article	2(1)(b)	of	the	1978	Vienna	Convention	brings																																																									
141	Genest	(n	15),	22.	
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within	 the	 scope	 of	 succession	 instances	 in	 which	 an	 existing	 State	 "replace[s]	 …	
another	in	the	responsibility	for	the	international	relations	of	territory”.	Cessions	of	
territory	(i.e.	the	agreed	transfer	of	a	piece	of	territory	from	one	State	to	another142)	
and	 incorporation	 (i.e.	 the	 voluntary	 integration	 of	 one	 State	 into	 another143)	 are	
cases	in	point.	As	they	do	not	involve	the	emergence	of	a	new	State,	these	instances	
of	succession	give	rise	to	particular	issues	and	are	subject	to	a	particular	regime.	At	
least	with	respect	to	cessions,	this	particular	regime	is	enshrined	in	Article	15	of	the	
1978	 Vienna	 Convention,	 which	 declares	 that	 following	 the	 transfer	 of	 territory,	
“(a)	treaties	of	the	predecessor	State	cease	to	be	in	force	in	respect	of	the	territory	
to	which	the	succession	of	States	relates"	while	“(b)	treaties	of	the	successor	State	
are	in	force	in	respect	of	the	territory	to	which	the	succession	of	States	relates.”	This	
provision	is	widely	held	to	reflect	general	international	law;144	unlike	with	respect	to	
other	 questions	 of	 State	 succession,	 debates	 therefore	 proceed	 from	 an	 agreed	
starting-point.			
	
That	said,	 the	recent	Sanum	 litigation	has	thrown	 into	stark	relief	 the	considerable	
uncertainties	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 law.	 As	 noted	 in	 the	 Introduction,	 in	 early	
2015,	the	Singapore	High	Court	held	that	the	1993	China-Laos	BIT	did	not	apply	to	an	
investor	incorporated	under	the	laws	of	Macao;	this	directly	contradicted	an	earlier	
finding	by	an	UNCITRAL	tribunal.145	The	subsequent	discussion	seeks	to	identify	the	
source	of	this	dispute	and	situate	it	within	the	legal	regime	governing	treaties	during	
instances	 of	 cession	 or	 incorporation;	 beyond	 that,	 it	 also	 shows	 that,	
notwithstanding	 the	 prominence	 of	 the	 conflicting	 decisions	 in	 the	 Sanum	
																																																								
142	O	Dörr,	Cession,	in	Max	Planck	Encyclopedia	of	Public	International	Law	(www.mpepil.com),	para.	
1;	Hafner/Novak	(n	17),	404;		Zimmermann,	Staatennachfolge	(n	17),	17.	
143	Dörr	(n	142),	para.	2;	Hafner/Novak	(n	17),	405;		Zimmermann,	Staatennachfolge	(n	17),	19.	
144	See	 e.g.	 In	 its	 commentary	 to	 draft	 article	 14	 (which	 became	 Article	 15	 of	 the	 1978	 Vienna	
Convention),	the	ILC	made	clear	that	the	provision	codified	an	existing	customary	rule	Yearbook	ILC	
1974,	 vol.	 II/1,	 208-209.	 Hafner/Novak	 note	 succinctly	 that	 "State	 practice	 	 before	 1978	 ...	 has	
confirmed	the	validity	of	this	rule	[Article	15]		as	part	of	customary	international	law“	(n	15,	at	411).	
For	further	support	see	Zimmermann,	EPIL	(n	17),	para.	8;	K	Odendahl,	Commentary	to	Article	29,	in	O	
Dörr/K	Schmalenbach	(eds),	The	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	Treaties	(2012),	500.	In	the	Sanum	
case,	the	arbitral	tribunal	noted	that	there	was	"unanimity	or	‘quasi-unanimity’	among	the	doctrine	to	
consider	that	Article	15	…	represents	customary	international	law"	(n	9,	at	para.	221).	
145	See	references	in	fn.	8	and	9.	
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proceedings,	 the	 rules	applicable	 to	 this	 type	of	State	succession	are	 in	 fact	 rather	
settled.		
	
a)	The	General	Regime:	Moving	Treaty	Frontiers	
The	 general	 regime	has	 been	developed	by	 reference	 to	 instances	 of	 cession.	 It	 is	
premised	on	the	understanding	that,	while	a	part	of	territory	is	transferred,	the	legal	
personality	of	the	transferring	and	receiving	States	remains	intact.146	In	this	scenario,	
the	 widely	 accepted	 default	 rule	 leaves	 the	 treaty	 status	 of	 the	 two	 States	
untouched	and	merely	extends	 the	geographical	 scope	of	 treaties	by	moving	 their		
‘frontiers’.	 The	 result	 is	 relatively	 straightforward:	 as	 noted	 by	 Zimmermann,	
“treaties	 of	 the	 predecessor	 cease	 to	 be	 in	 force	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 ceded	 territory	
while	 treaties	of	 the	 successor	generally	extend	 ipso	 facto	 to	 this	 territory.”147	The	
two	paragraphs	of	Article	15	of	the	1978	Convention	provide	for	this	substitution;	in	
so	 doing,	 they	 ensure	 that,	 for	 each	 State,	 treaties	 are	 "binding	 in	 respect	 of	 its	
entire	territory".148		
		
As	 with	 other	 rules	 (and	 as	 the	 use	 of	 the	 term	 ‘generally’	 in	 Zimmermann’s	
formulation	 suggests),	 the	moving	 treaty	 frontiers	 rule	 does	 not	 apply	 absolutely.	
The	law	leaves	room	for	agreement	to	the	contrary;	and	where	a	treaty	specifically	
relates	to	the	ceded	territory,	a	contrary	approach	may	indeed	be	called	for.	Article	
15	of	the	1978	Vienna	Convention	gives	effect	to	these	considerations	by	admitting	
for	 exceptions	 to	 the	 moving	 frontier	 principle	 if	 its	 application	 “would	 be	
incompatible	with	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	treaty	or	would	radically	change	the	
																																																								
146	As	the	ILC	noted	in	its	commentary,	instances	of	cession	"do	involve	a	'succession	of	States'	in	the	
sense	 that	 this	 concept	 is	used	 in	 the	present	draft	 articles,	namely	a	 replacement	of	one	State	by	
another	in	the	responsibility	for	the	international	relations	of	territory"	(ILC	Yearbook	1974,	vol.	II/1,	
208).	
147	Zimmermann,	EPIL	(n	17),	para	8.	Waldock’s	more	complicated	formulation	distinguishes	between	
a	positive	aspect	(“the	treaties	of	the	successor	State	begin	automatically	to	apply	 in	respect	of	the	
[ceded]	 territory	 as	 from	 the	 date	 of	 the	 succession”)	 and	 a	 negative	 aspect	 (“the	 treaties	 of	 the	
predecessor	State	…	cease	automatically	to	apply	in	respect	of	the	territory”);	but	in	essence,	the	rule	
remains	one	of	“a	simple	substitution	of	one	treaty	regime	for	another”:	H	Waldock,	Second	Report	
on	Succession	in	Respect	of	Treaties,	ILC	Yearbook	1969,	vol.	II,	at	52.	
148	As	indicated	by	Article	29	of	the	1969	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	Treaties.		
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conditions	 for	 its	 operation“;149	further	 exceptions	 flow	 from	 the	 application	 of	
Articles	 11	 and	 12	 of	 the	 1978	 Vienna	 Convention,	 pursuant	 to	 which	 successor	
States	 are	 bound	 to	 observe	 boundary	 and	 other	 localised	 treaties. 150 	But	
notwithstanding	 these	exceptions,	 as	 a	principle,	 the	 ‘moving	 treaty	 frontiers	 rule’	
has	regularly	been	applied,	and	was	well	established	by	the	time	of	the	adoption	of	
the	1978	Vienna	Convention.151	
	
State	practice	since	1978	is	relatively	sparse.	Of	the	few	instances	of	cession	and/or	
incorporation	 that	 have	 taken	 place,	 some	 would	 seem	 to	 affirm	 the	 approach	
adopted	in	Article	15	of	the	1978	Vienna	Convention,	while	in	two	particular	cases,	
States	have	opted	for	a	nuanced	approach.	As	for	confirmatory	practice,	the	transfer	
of	Walvis	Bay	from	South	Africa	to	Namibia	 illustrates	the	operation	of	the	moving	
treaty	 frontiers	 rule.	152 	After	 1994,	 and	 subject	 to	 some	 special	 arrangements,	
“treaties	of	the	predecessor	[South	Africa]	cease[d]	to	be	 in	force	 in	respect	of	the	
ceded	 territory	while	 treaties	of	 the	 successor	 [Namibia]	 generally	extend[ed]	 ipso	
facto	to	[Walvis	Bay].”153	By	and	large,	the	moving	frontiers	principle	has	also	shaped	
practice	 during	 the	 process	 of	 German	 unification,	 generally	 treated	 as	 a	 case	 of	
incorporation,	 to	 which	 the	 rules	 governing	 cessions	 were	 applied	 by	 analogy:154																																																									
149	Similar	exceptions	are	included	in	Article	29	VCLT,	pursuant	to	which	treaties	generally	apply	tot	he	
entirety	of	a	State’s	territory:	this	presumption	does	not	apply	if	"a	different	intention	appears	from	
the	treaty	or	is	otherwise	established“.In	the	Sanum	case,	the	arbitral	tribunal	held	"the	exceptions	to	
Article	15	of	the	VCST	[to	be]	encompassed	in	the	exceptions	to		Article	29	of	the	VCLT"	(n	XX,	at	para.	
229).		
150	See	supra,	section	4.a.		
151	See	the	references	in	fn.	141.		
152	See	the	Treaty	between	the	Government	of	the	Republic	of	South	Africa	and	the	Government	of	
the	 Republic	 of	 Namibia	with	 Respect	 to	Walvis	 Bay	 and	 the	Off-Shore	 Islands,	 International	 Legal	
Materials	 33	 (1994),	 1526;	 and	 further	 Zimmermann,	 Staatennachfolge	 (n	 17),	 447-449.	 For	
background	 information	 see	 AJ	 Hoffmann,	 Walvis	 Bay,	 in	 Max	 Planck	 Encyclopedia	 of	 Public	
International	Law	(www.mpepil.com).	
153	Cf.	Zimmermann,	EPIL	(n	17)	para	8.	Special	arrangements	were	e.g.	reached	to	accommodate	the	
rights	of	South	African	residents	in	Walvis	Bay	and	the	effect	of	public	acts	rendered	during	the	South	
African	rule:	see	Hoffmann	(n	152),	paras.	15-17.				
154	See	 Hafner/Novak	 (n	 17),	 411-412;	 Zimmermann,	 Staatennachfolge	 (n	 17),	 245-282	 (with	many	
details).	This	analoguous	application	 initially	of	the	moving	treaty	frontiers	rule	to	the	unification	of	
Germany	met	with	some	resistance,	as	the	1978	Vienna	Convention	does	not	lay		down	special	rules	
for	an	incorporation	of	a	State,	but	 instead,	 in	Article	31,	formulated	a	particular	rule	governing	the	
uniting	of	States.	 In	the	case	of	Germany,	Article	31	clearly	was	not	applied.	For	a	clear	analysis	see	
Stern	(n	17),	237-242.	
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according	 to	 Article	 11	 of	 the	 Unification	 Treaty,155	agreements	 concluded	 by	 the	
Federal	 Republic	 of	Germany	 (‘FRG’),	 as	 a	 rule,	would	 apply	 to	 the	 entire	German	
territory;	whereas	the	FRG	would	merely	enter	into	consultations	regarding	the	fate	
of	the	German	Democratic	Republic’s	former	treaties	according	to	Article	12.156		
	
The	two	most	prominent	territorial	transfers	that	have	taken	place	since	1978	–	viz.	
the	 return	 to	 China,	 of	 Hong	 Kong	 and	Macao157	–	 however	 have	 followed	 a	 very	
different	 (perhaps	 indeed	 “unique”158)	 logic.	 	 As	 Macao	 and	 Hong	 Kong	 were	 to	
retain	a	special	status	within	the	PRC,	the	moving	frontier	principle	was	not	applied	
in	 an	 unqualified	 manner.	 In	 addition	 to	 ensuring	 the	 transfer,	 the	 arrangements	
between	China	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	United	Kingdom	and	Portugal	on	the	other,	
sought	to	preserve	pre-existing	treaties	irrespective	of	whether	these	had	applied	to	
China	before	the	transfer.	To	that	effect,	 in	their	bilateral	Declarations	of	1984	and	
1987,	the	treaty	parties	did	not	automatically	extend	Chinese	treaties	to	Hong	Kong	
and	Macao.159	More	importantly,	they	envisaged	that	(as	noted	in	the	1984	UK-China	
Declaration)	“[i]nternational	agreements	to	which	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	 is	
not	a	party,	but	which	are	implemented	in	Hong	Kong,	may	remain	implemented	in	
the	[Hong	Kong	Special	Administrative	Region]”.160	As	regards	Hong	Kong,	the	Joint	
Liaison	Group	established	under	the	1984	Declaration	was	to	make	ample	use	of	the	
latter	 option	 (continued	 implementation)	 as	 far	 as	 multilateral	 treaties	 are	
																																																								
155	Treaty	on	the	Unification	of	Germany,	International	Legal	Materials	30	(1991),	457.	
156	As	 Aust	 notes	 (n	 69,	 374),	 while	 not	 bound	 by	 the	 Unification	 Treaty,	 other	 states	 generally	
accepted	the	approach	adopted	in	Articles	11	and	12.	For	further	detail	see	D	Papenfuß,	The	Fate	of	
the	International	Treaties	of	the	GDR	within	the	Framework	of	German	Unification,	American	Journal	
of	International	Law	92	(1998)	469;	and	the	references	in	fn.	154.		
157 	Whether	 these	 instances	 are	 properly	 characterised	 as	 'State	 succession'	 is	 a	 matter	 of	
controversy:	according	to	the	PRC’s	view,	it	was	a	mere	"resumption"	of	sovereignty	over	territories	
that	 had	 never	 been	 ceded.	 However,	 even	 on	 that	 basis,	 both	 instances	 would	 involve	 the	 “the	
replacement	of	one	State	by	another	in	the	responsibility	for	the	international	relations	of	territory”	
(as	per	Article	2(1)(b)	of	the	1978	Vienna	Convention).	For	comment	see	the	Sanum	award,	at	para.	
237;	but	cf.	Wang	(n	13),	569-570.	
158	Aust	(n	69),	386.	
159	See	 International	 Legal	Materials	 1984,	 1366	 (Joint	UK-China	Declaration)	 and	UN	Treaty	 Series,	
vol.	1498,	228	(Joint	China-Portugal	Declaration).	For	a	fuller	analysis	see	R	Mushkat,	Hong	Kong	and	
Succession	of	 Treaties,	 International	 and	Comparative	 Law	Quarterly	 46	 (1997),	 181;	 Zimmermann,	
Staatennachfolge	(n	17),	432-337;	and	Cheng	(n	15),	209-236.		
160	See	Annex	I,	Section	XI	of	the	1984	Joint	UK-China	Declaration	(n	159).	
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concerned;	 with	 the	 result	 that,	 “with	 few	 exceptions,	 multilateral	 treaties	 which	
had	 applied	 to	 Hong	 Kong	 before	 handover	 continued	 to	 apply	 thereafter	 in	 all	
essential	 respects”.161	For	bilateral	 treaties,	 the	parties	were	also	keen	 to	preserve	
some	autonomy	for	Macao	and	Hong	Kong,	but	adopted	a	different	approach:	in	the	
words	of	one	commentator	 (speaking	to	 the	situation	 in	Hong	Kong),	“none	of	 the	
then	 existing	 bilateral	 treaties	 with	 third	 States	 would	 apply	 to	 the	 HKSAR	 after	
handover.”162	Rather,	 Hong	 Kong	 and	 Macao	 were	 entrusted	 directly	 to	 conclude	
bilateral	agreements	in	their	own	right,	which	would	then	remain	in	force.	
	
These	considerations	highlight	 the	 flexibility	of	 the	general	 framework,	which	does	
not	preclude	States	from	agreeing	on	special	solutions	for	particular	problems	–	and	
which	 in	 the	case	of	Hong	Kong	and	Macao,	allowed	 the	parties	 to	 implement	 the	
‘one	 country,	 two	 systems’	 approach	 that	 informed	 the	 eventual	 arrangements.		
Looking	at	developments	since	1978,	perhaps	it	could	be	said	that	practice	has	not	
only	been	sparse,	but	also	dominated	by	unusual	cases;	and	that	the	arrangements	
reached	 with	 respect	 to	 Hong	 Kong	 and	 Macao	 (and	 to	 some	 extent	 Germany)	
reflect	that	fact.	
	
b)	 Investment	 Treaty	 Practice:	 Agreement	 on	 Principle,	 but	 Difficulties	 with	
‘Unique’	Cases	
Investment	treaty	practice	largely	mirrors	the	general	developments	outlined	in	the	
preceding	 section.	 Given	 the	 recent	 focus	 on	 the	 Sanum	 litigation	 with	 its	
contradictory	 outcomes,	 it	 is	 worth	 underlining	 that	 there	 is	 a	 large	 measure	 of	
agreement	 on	 the	 applicable	 regime,	 and	 on	 the	 presumptive	 relevance	 of	 the	
moving	frontiers	principle	in	particular.		
	
Read	 properly,	 the	 decisions	 rendered	 in	 the	 Sanum	 litigation	 reflect	 different	
interpretations	 of	 the	 peculiar	 status	 of	 Macao	 under	 Chinese	 BITs	 entered	 into	
before	Macao’s	 return.	 These	different	 interpretations	might	have	 implications	 for	
																																																								
161	Aust	(n	69),	390.	
162	Aust	(n	69),	390.	
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the	status	of	Hong	Kong	(in	relation	to	which	similar	questions	might	arise),	but	are	
unlikely	to	be	of	more	general	relevance.	 In	fact,	 in	their	approach	to	the	status	of	
Macao,	the	UNCITRAL	arbitral	tribunal	and	the	Singapore	High	Court	may	not	have	
been	that	far	apart.	Proceeding	from	the	rule	set	out	in	Article	15	of	the	1978	Vienna	
Convention,	they	both	agreed	that	treaties	presumptively	applied	to	the	entirety	of	a	
State’s	 territory	 (and	 thus	 ‘moved’	with	 the	 treaty	 party’s	 frontiers),	 but	 that	 this	
presumption	could	be	rebutted.	The	main	question	dividing	them	was	whether	the	
applicable	BIT	between	China	and	Laos	came	within	the	scope	of	the	exceptions	to	
the	 principle.	 Their	 disagreement	 on	 this	 point	 can	 however	 to	 some	 extent	 be	
explained	by	the	availability	of	evidence:	while	the	arbitral	tribunal	had	to	decide	in	
the	absence	of	instructive	information,163	the	Singapore	High	Court	could	rely	on	an	
exchange	 of	 letters,	 between	 China	 and	 Laos,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 BIT	 should	 not	
apply	 to	 Macao.	164	This	 party	 agreement	 (once	 accepted	 and	 admitted	 into	 the	
proceedings165)	 clearly	 strengthened	 the	 case	 for	 an	 exception.	 Conversely,	 the	
reliance	placed	on	 it	 limits	 the	 impact	 of	 the	Sanum	decision	on	 future	 cases;	 the	
status	of	Macao	(and	Hong	Kong)	in	relation	to	other	Chinese	BITs	notably	remains	
open	to	debate.166	Unless	the	parties	to	these	treaties	follow	the	lead	of	China	and	
Laos	and	provide	explicit	 clarification,167	the	matter	 is	 likely	 to	be	argued	 in	 future	
disputes	 implicating	Hong	Kong	or	Macao	 (or	Hong	Kong/Macao-based	 claimants):	
on	 the	basis	of	 the	considerations	advanced	above,168	the	better	view	would	be	to	
accept	that	for	the	unusual	cases	of	cessions	such	as	Hong	Kong	and	Macao	(which	
																																																								
163	See	para.	232	of	 the	Sanum	UNCITRAL	award	 (n	9),	 referring	 to	 the	"paucity	of	 factual	elements	
presented	by	the	Parties“.		
164	According	to	the	Singapore	High	Court,	this	was	a	"key	plank“	of	the	evidence:	see	Singapore	High	
Court	(n	10),	para.	38.	
165	Whether	 the	 letters	 should	 be	 admitted	 at	 the	 review	 stage	 (even	 though	 they	were	 produced	
after	the	arbitral	tribunal	had	rendered	its	award)	was	a	crucial	question:	see	paras.	43-56	of	the	High	
Court	judgment	(n	10);	and	Hwang/Chang	(n	13),	517-519,	for	comment.	
166	See	Hart/Srikumar	 (n	13),	198:	“the	 letters	exchanged	 in	 relation	 to	 the	China-Laos	BIT	will	have	
little	salience	for	the	interpretation	of	other	BITs	in	future	disputes.”	
167	It	is	worth	noting	that	some	of	China’s	BITs	expressly	address	the	matter:	see	e.g.	the	2006	China-
Russia	BIT	and	Protocol	(stipulating	that	"[u]nless	otherwise	agreed	by	both	Contracting	Parties,	the	
Agreement	does	not	apply	to	the	Hong	Kong	Special	Administrative	Region	of	the	People's	Republic	of	
China	and	the	Macao	SpecialAdministrative	Region	of	People's	Republic	of	China").		
168	See	above,	section	5.a.	
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purposefully	 avoid	 the	 full	 integration	 of	 the	 ceded	 territory),	 the	 moving	 treaty	
frontiers	rule	needs	to	be	qualified.169		
	
Whatever	 position	 is	 taken	 on	 the	 geographical	 scope	 of	 Chinese	 BITs,	 it	 is	worth	
noting	that	outside	the	particular	arrangements	obtaining	in	Macao	and	Hong	Kong,	
cessions	and	incorporations	raise	few	problems.	The	limited	practice	available	so	far	
in	 fact	 suggests	 that	 they	 are	 dealt	 with	 routinely,	 by	 a	 simple	 application	 of	 the	
moving	 frontiers	 rule.	 In	 line	 with	 that	 rule,	 German	 BITs	 concluded	 before	
unification	 were	 routinely	 applied	 to	 the	 GDR	 after	 1990.170	As	 for	 institutional	
arrangements,	 Germany’s	 ICSID	membership	was	 automatically	 extended	 to	 cover	
the	united	Germany	in	its	entirety.171	As	regards	Walvis	Bay,	the	available	evidence	is	
limited;	 however,	 it	 seems	 the	 one	 investment	 treaty	 concluded	 by	 South	 Africa	
prior	to	1994	(a	1974	BIT	with	Portugal)	did	not	apply	to	Walvis	Bay	after	its	return	
to	 Namibia. 172 	Lastly,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that,	 at	 least	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 ICSID	
Convention,	the	arbitral	tribunal	in	Tza	Yap	Shum	v.	Peru	applied	the	moving	treaty	
frontiers	principle	even	in	relation	to	China/Hong	Kong:	assessing	the	propriety	of	a	
claim	by	a	Hong	Kong-based	 investor,	 the	 tribunal	was	 content	 to	note	 that	China	
had	not	excluded	the	application	of	the	ICSID	Convention	to	Hong	Kong	pursuant	to	
its	 Article	 70;	 under	 those	 circumstances,	 it	 was	 sufficient	 for	 the	 investor	 to	
establish	 that	 it	 was	 a	 Chinese	 national	 (irrespective	 of	 the	 place	 of	 its	
																																																								
169	As	a	separate	matter,	it	is	worth	considering	whether,	in	relation	to	Macao-	(or	Hong	Kong-)based	
claimants	invoking	provisions	of	Chinese	BITs,	the	place	of	 incorporation	is	determinative:	according	
to	Hart/Srikumar,	"whether	the	Macanese	company	enjoyed	the	BIT's	protection	should	have	turned	
on	the	company's	nationality",	not	the	place	of	its	incorporation:	see	Hart/Srikumar	(n	13),	195-197.	
On	the	respective	roles	of	nationality	and	geographical	scope	of	application	see	further	the	award	in	
Tza	 Yap	 Shum	 v	 Republic	 of	 Peru	 (Decision	 on	 Jurisdiction	 and	 Competence)	 (ICSID	 Case	 No	
ARB/07/06),	at	paras.	67-77,	and	below,	text	at	fn.	173.		
170	This	followed	from	Article	11	of	the	Unification	Treaty	(n	155).	The	German	government	notified	its	
treaty	partners	of	the	approach	adopted	under	that	treaty;	its	diplomatic	notes	met	with	little,	if	any,	
resistance:	see	Zimmermann,	Staatennachfolge	(n	17),	246-251	with	references.		
171	Given	the	distinct	legal	regimes	addressed	in	sections	3	and	4	above,	it	bears	underlying	that	the	
moving	 treaty	 frontiers	 rule	 covers	 institutional	 treaties	 as	well.	 In	 line	with	 this,	 Article	 11	 of	 the	
Unification	 Treaty	 (n	 155)	 expressly	 mentioned	 treaties	 involving	 membership	 in	 international	
organisations.		
172	For	brief	information	see	L	Poulsen,	Bounded	Rationality	and	Economic	Diplomacy	(2015),	168	(fn.	
28).		
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incorporation).173	All	this	suggests	that	instances	of	cession	and	incorporation	do	not	
give	rise	to	any	conceptual	problems.		
	
	
6.	Concluding	Observations		
The	 preceding	 sections	 have	 revisited	 some	 of	 the	 more	 relevant	 issues	 facing	
investment	 lawyers	 as	 they	 seek	 to	 apply	 rules	 of	 State	 succession	 to	 investment	
treaty	law.	Notwithstanding	the	popular	perception	of	State	succession	as	a	hotbed	
of	 legal	controversy,	 it	 is	worth	noting	that	 there	are	relevant	areas	of	agreement,	
where	 the	 law	 is	 settled.	 The	 treatment	 of	 membership	 rights	 (not	 generally	
susceptible	 to	 be	 'inherited'	 by	 succession)	 is	 one	 such	 area;	 the	 impact	 of	 the	
moving	 treaty	 frontiers	 principle	 on	 cessions	 of	 territory	 (resulting,	 under	 normal	
circumstances,	 in	 the	 extension	of	 treaties	 of	 the	 'receiving	 State')	 another.	When	
these	 issues	 have	 arisen,	 arbitral	 investment	 treaty	 practice	 seems	 to	 follow	
the	 	general	 regime:	 hence	 new	 States	 join	 ICSID	 as	 new	members,	 and	 debates	
about	cessions	of	territory	proceed	from	the	moving	treaty	frontiers	principle,	which	
provides	the	widely-agreed	starting	point	and	applies	presumptively.		
	
Needless	 to	 say	 that	 not	 everything	 is	 settled;	 the	 preceding	 sections	 have	 also	
highlighted	 areas	 of	 contestation	 and	 uncertainty.	 The	 proper	 application	 of	 the	
moving	 treaty	 frontiers	 principle	 to	 unusual	 cessions	 of	 territory	 -	 such	 as	 those	
involving	 Macao	 and	 Hong	 Kong	 -	 counts	 among	 these.	 Notwithstanding	 two	
decisions	by	an	UNCITRAL	arbitral	tribunal	and	the	Singapore	High	Court,	the	status	
of	the	two	territories	with	respect	to	Chinese	BITs	so	far	remains	uncertain:	as	noted	
above,	the	better	view	would	be	to	treat	Macao	and	Hong	Kong	as	special	instances	
of	cession	not	presumptively	governed	by	the	moving	treaty	frontier	principle.	
		
While	 raising	 important	 legal	 issues,	 the	 status	 of	 Macao	 and	 Hong	 Kong	 under	
Chinese	BITs	 is	a	specific	problem	that	 implicates	relatively	marginal	aspects	of	the	
regime	 of	 succession.	 By	 contrast,	 the	 status	 of	 new	 States	 in	 relation	 to	 BITs																																																									
173	Tza	Yap	Shum	v.	Peru	(n	169),	at	paras.	68-70.	Whether	the	same	argument	should	apply	to	a	BIT	is	
a	matter	of	debate:	see	supra,	fn.	169.	
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concluded	by	their	predecessors	raises	structural	questions	of	general	relevance:	this	
is	 a	 major	 area	 of	 uncertainty.	 As	 the	 above	 analysis	 demonstrates,	 investment	
tribunals	have	so	 far	avoided	a	 full	engagement	with	 the	 long-standing	conceptual	
debate	between	'strict	continuity'	and	'clean	slate'	approaches.	To	some	extent,	they	
could	 do	 so	 as	 (in	 line	 with	 general	 developments),	 State	 parties	 to	 investment	
treaties	 have	 frequently	 determined	 the	 fate	 of	 prior	 BITs	 through	 explicit	
agreements	 -	 which	 almost	 inevitably	 ensure	 continuity	 in	 investment	 treaty	
relations.	Given	the	renewed	popularity,	 in	recent	scholarship,	of	the	long-standing	
conceptual	 debate,	 it	 is	 worth	 underlining	 that,	 where	 no	 explicit	 agreement	 has	
been	reached,	 there	 is	 room	to	engage	with	arguments	based	on	 implied,	or	 tacit,	
consent:	 such	arguments	no	doubt	need	 to	be	made	carefully,	but	 in	principle	are	
available.	The	 key	 task	 throughout	 is	 to	 identify	 the	 intention	 of	 the	 (putative)	
parties	to	the	treaty,	which	does	not	have	to	be	expressed	in	a	particular	form.	Only	
if	 neither	 explicit	 nor	 implied	 consent	 can	 be	 established	 does	 the	 question	 of	
automatic	 succession	 to	 BITs	 arise.	 As	 noted	 above,	 the	 argument	 in	 favour	 of	
automaticity	 is	 a	 difficult	 one,	 as	 bilateral	 treaties	 have	 traditionally	 been	 seen	 as	
mere	 inter-State	 exchanges	 of	 benefits.	 However,	 claims	 for	 automatic	 treaty	
continuity	 should	 not	 be	 dismissed	 out	 of	 hand.	 They	 can	 e.g.	 be	 supported	 by	
reference	 to	 the	 particular	 nature	 of	 BITs,	which	 after	 all	 establish	 rights	 of	 third-
party	beneficiaries;	these	could	be	said	to	devolve	with	the	territory.	
	
Stepping	back	from	the	debates	about	particularities,	it	is	interesting	to	note	that	so	
far,	the	application	of	State	succession	rules	to	investment	treaties	has	so	far	rarely	
become	a	major	 issue	(though	cases	such	as	Sanum	and	World	Wide	Minerals	may	
signal	 a	 change).	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 is	 settled,	 investment	 lawyers	 seem	
comfortable	 in	applying	 the	general	 regime	of	State	 succession:	by	and	 large,	 they	
accept	the	general	rules	and	give	effect	to	them	within	the	field	of	investment	law.	
Where	 the	general	 regime	 is	uncertain	 (as	 it	notably	 is	with	 respect	 to	new	States	
and	prior	BITs),	 investment	tribunals	have	sought	to	'muddle	through'	 in	search	for	
pragmatic	 and	 equitable	 solutions;	 they	 have	 (to	 adapt	 Lord	Wright’s	 description)	
"proceed[ed]	 from	case	 to	 case,	 like	 the	 ancient	Mediterranean	mariners,	 hugging	
the	coast	 from	point	 to	point	and	avoiding	 the	dangers	of	 the	open	sea	of	 system	
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and	science".174	Such	an	approach	is	understandable,	as	the	general	regime	of	State	
succession	 can	 indeed	 very	 much	 feel	 like	 an	 ‘open	 sea’	 and	 –	 unlike	 other	 core	
aspects	of	public	international	law	–	needs	to	be	approached	without	the	benefit	of	
detailed	 charts	 and	 compasses.	 But	 conversely,	 having	 ‘hugged	 the	 coast’,	
investment	 tribunals	 have	 so	 far	 done	 relatively	 little	 to	 clarify	 the	 law	 of	 State	
succession:	they	have	tended	to	be	receivers	of	general	rules,	not	shaped	them.	This	
in	turn	has	meant	that	an	area	of	law	rather	in	need	of	clarification	remains	in	many	
ways	obscure:	 the	potential	of	 arbitral	 awards	 to	 consolidate	and	develop	 the	 law	
has	so	far	not	been	realised.			
	
A	final	thought:	if	the	application	of	State	succession	rules	has	so	far	rarely	become	a	
major	 issue	 in	 investment	 arbitration,	 this	 would	 also	 seem	 to	 suggest	 that	
investment	 treaties	 are	 not	 viewed	 as	 particular	 controversial	 commitments.	 As	
noted	above,	in	many	instances,	successor	States	are	quite	happy	to	continue	them.	
This	 preference	 for	 stability	 in	 investment	 treaty	 relations	 is	 in	 line	 with	 general	
trends	 in	 recent	 succession	 practice	 –	 and	 yet,	 it	 deserves	 to	 be	mentioned,	 as	 it	
stands	 in	 marked	 contrast	 to	 debates	 during	 decolonisation,	 when	 arrangements	
benefiting	 foreign	 investors	 (then	 typically	 contract-based)	 prompted	 major	
controversy.	 	Seen	 in	 this	 light,	 the	 pragmatic	 handling	 of	 State	 succession	 issues	
may	be	 taken	 to	 reflect	a	gradual	acceptance	of	 the	 investment	protection	 regime	
over	the	past	decades.			
	
																																																								
174	See	RA	(Lord)	Wright,	The	Study	of	the	Law,	Law	Quarterly	Review	54	(1938),	185,	at	186.	
